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The Concept of Property in the Early
Common Law
DAVID J. SEIPP
"There is nothing'" wrote William Blackstone, "which so generally
strikes the imagination and engages the affections of mankind, as the
right of property "' Property continues to occupy a place of enormous
importance in American legal thought. More than just a staple of the
first-year law school curriculum, the concept of property guides the
application of constitutional doctrines of due process and eminent domain.2 A grand division between "property rules" and "liability rules"
classifies our common law entitlements.' Property is a concept of such
longstanding importance in our law, of such great inertial momentum,
that it has expanded to include nonphysical property in goodwill, inventions, designs, artistic expression, symbols, secrets, privacy, and ce1. 2

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

2 (Oxford

1766). For Blackstone, this right of property was "that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." Id.
Throughout this article, spelling, punctuation, and capitalization of quotations have
been modernized. Dates are calculated by "historical year" commencing January 1.
2. See, e.g.,

BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977);

RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

(1985);

JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CON-

1-3 (1990); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE
L.J. 127, 128-33 (1990).
3. See Guido Calabresi & A.Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-10 (1972).
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lebrity, as well as "new" property in social security benefits, government
contracts, job security, and occupational licenses.' Recent scholars have
identified property with autonomy, personality, political participation,
and reliance interests.' Thus expanded, the concept of property threatens
to disintegrate. 6 If it includes everything, does it mean anything?
Important as the concept of property was and is for lawyers, Blackstone observed that "there are very few that will give themselves the
trouble to consider the origin and foundation of this right. Pleased as
we are with the possession, we seem afraid to look back to the means
by which it was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title' 7
Legal scholars addressing the foundation of property rights typically
begin with the writings of John Locke, an English Whig philosopher
of the late seventeenth century. They give little consideration to the
meaning, scope, or importance of property in the centuries of common
law development prior to Locke's time. Legal historians have typically
chosen the modem lawyer's property concept as an organizing category
for doctrines that lawyers in past centuries would not have recognized
by that label. 9
This article summarizes a long and important development of property ideas in English common law discourse prior to the seventeenth
century. I focus attention on the use of property language and property
4. See, e.g., Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778-87 (1964);
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Propertyof the Nineteenth Century: The Development
of the Modern Concept of Property,29 BuFF. L. REv. 325, 334-54, 358-59 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Richard Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil
Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 135 (1963); Frank Michelman, Property as a Constitutional
Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097, 1109-14 (1981); Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance
Interest in Property,40 STAN. L. REv. 614, 652-701 (1988); Underkuffler, supra note
2, at 142-47.
6. E.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on PrivateProperty,9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 35982 (1954); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property,in PROPERTY: NoMos XXII
69, 74-78 (Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds., 1980); John W. Van Doren, Private
Property: A Study in Incoherence, 63 U. DET. L. REv. 683, 684-86, 700-701 (1986).
See NEDELSKY, supra note 2, at 223; Vandevelde, supra note 4, at 362-63.
7. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 2.
8. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 9-16 ; Carol M. Rose, Possessionas the Origin
of Property,52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 73-74 (1985); Richard Epstein, Possession as the
Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221, 1227-30 (1979). A welcome exception is Charles
Donahue, Jr., The Futureofthe Concept ofPropertyPredictedfromIts Past,in PROPERTY:
NoMos XXII, supra note 6, at 35-40.
9. See, e.g., THEODORE ET. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
504-623 (5th ed., 1956) ("Part III. Real Property"); S.EC. MILsOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 99-239 (2d ed., 1981) ("Part II. Property in Land").
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concepts in English legal literature. This focus challenges, in particular,
the contemporary assumption that land is the paradigm of property
analysis.' 0 For more than two centuries, the steady development of
property doctrines in medieval English common law was completely
divorced from disputes concerning the possession of land. It focused
instead on controversies about goods and animals. Later, English lawyers
in the Tudor era formulated an abstract concept of property and assimilated land to their treatment of goods and animals. At the same
time, they wove into their doctrines the strands of a contemporary
theological debate about the origins of individual ownership and the
role of the state. English lawyers developed and elevated their concept
of property to a position of central importance in their thinking.

A Gap in Legal Terminology
I start with the notion that you can't talk about something if you
haven't got a word for it." Close study of the words lawyers used and
did not use in the past can help'recover some of the mental abstractions
they employed. Because the lawyers who argued in the common law
courts of England kept a running record of important snippets of courtroom argument from the 1290s onward, I have been able to eavesdrop
on them, noticing in particular the things I would expect to hear, but
find they did not say. For most of that period, lawyers were not using
some of the fundamental abstractions we take for granted as original,
seemingly inevitable building blocks of their (and our) substantive legal
knowledge.
Lawyers in England got along for about two centuries, from 1290 to
1490 or so, without using any single term that had the scope, application,
and explanatory power that later lawyers found in the words "property"
and "ownership" That is to say, they lacked a word for legally protected
interests in both land and goods, one that would assimilate these interests
to some degree, and separate them from other legally protected relations.
This article is an attempt to account for the changing application of
the term "property" before, during, and after this crucial period.
10. See any modem American casebook or treatise on "property law."

11. Meant as a working hypothesis, this proposition has attracted more objections
from readers of prior drafts than I had expected. I do not say that all concepts need
words or that you can't think about something if you don't have a unitary label to
attach to it. My point is about communicating a concept to others sharing the same
language. For that, I am supposing, a word or phrase is necessary. Lack of any word
or phrase suggests that no unitary concept is being communicated.
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English people then had no more trouble in articulating what were
their "own" lands or money or personal belongings than we do now
in identifying what is ours. Indeed it was a truism of the entire period
that law was necessary chiefly for this purpose. University study of
Roman law began with the basic definition of justice: rendering to each
person what was his own (suum).1 2 The Bible enjoined you not to steal
and not to covet your neighbor's goods, but the Bible did not tell you
what was yours and what your neighbor's. Human law aided obedience
to God's law
by identifying what was mine and what was yours, meum
3
et tuum.'
This does not get us very far. True, the terminology of "mine" and
"yours" was then, as it is now, applied indifferently to land, animals,
and inanimate objects. It was also appropriate, however, to use such
terminology for one's name, spouse, children, parents, servants, friends,
country, king, lord, body, soul, sins, debts, thoughts, death, and a lot
of other possessive uses that stretch far beyond the legal pigeonhole
that lawyers later labeled "property." What turns out to be "missing"
in the common law literature from 1290 to 1490 is a term narrower
than the overinclusive possessive "mine" and the verb "have," but broad
enough to encompass what earlier and later conceptions
of "property"
4
took as paradigms: land, goods, and animals.'
This might fairly be described as a "gap" in the development of the
medieval English lawyers' vocabulary. In the century before 1280, the
fledgling profession of English common law judges did have such a
15
term, the Latin proprietas.
Proprietasplayed an important structural
role in the handful of legal treatises that survive from that period. These
works, especially the mid-thirteenth century treatise attributed to Henry
12. J. INST. 1.l.pr; DIG. 1.1.10.pr (Ulpian, Regularum 1).
13. See infra, text accompanying note 211. The standard gloss of Accursius on Justinian's Digest (c.1250) reasoned that divine law enjoined "thou shalt not steal" but
that human law (ius gentium) instituted individual property. 2 R.W. CARLYLE & A.T.
CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 48 & n.2

(1970).
14. John Locke and a few other seventeenth-century political writers combined attributes commonly said to be "mine" (self, life, limbs, liberty, labor) with things commonly said to be "my property" (land, goods, animals). THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
382-83 (1968) (pt. 2, ch. 30, p. 179 in 1651 ed.); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 287-88, 350, 383 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960); RICHARD OVERTON, AN ARROW AGAINST ALL TYRANTS 3-4 (London 1646), reprinted in G.E. AYLMER, THE
LEVELLERS IN THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 68, 68-69 (1975). They may also have been

combining the two senses of "property" as ownership and "property" as attribute. See
also infra, text accompanying notes 267-68.
15. On the derivation of our word "property," see Donahue, supra note 8, at 31-32.
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de Bracton, clearly differentiated "property" relations from two other
categories: first, "personal" status relations among free persons in various positions of power and subordination, and second, "obligations,"
contractual and tortious.'6 In application to land, goods, and slaves, the
property abstraction traced back to classical Roman law through the
medium of canon law and medieval civil law texts.' 7 Jurists in continental Europe continued to use and elaborate this concept in succeeding
centuries.
Between 1290 and 1490, however, when the written language of the
professional advocates in England was Anglo-Norman French, lawyers
made practically no use at all of the cognate term propret in reference
to land.' 8 What made sense in the early treatises no longer made sense
in the context of Year Book dialogue. The slippery relationship between
language and conceptual structure turns out to be more complex, therefore, than my initial, simple premise would suggest. If you are not using
a word for something, but it was used by earlier generations whose
learning you profess to share, and is currently used by others (canonists
and civilians) whose learning you regard as analogous to your own, you
may or may not be thinking about that something.
When lawyers did speak of "property" in the Year Books-and in
the first hundred years of these reports the term was genuinely scarce"property" referred to interests in domestic animals and goods and on
a few occasions to interests in less tangible entities assimilated to those
paradigm categories. One did not say "this is my property" as we use
the term now. Rather, one said "I have property in it" or "the property
of it is to (or with) me." Property was thus a characteristic or attribute
(or "property") of a cow or a jewel or a sum of money, not a shorthand
referent to the thing itself. Lawyers typically talked about the "property"
in a thing when the person with that "property" was not the person
who actually had the thing in hand. It is curious that in the most
common procedural setting, when two or more persons made inconsistent claims of "property" in the same animal, lawyers throughout
most of the Year Book period showed very little interest in how the
actual judicial determination of property would be made.'
As the fifteenth century progressed, English lawyers made increasingly
frequent use of "property" terminology, still in reference to goods and
animals, but not land. I notice increasingly the familiar conceptual
16. See infra, text accompanying notes 21-31.
17. See ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL
18. See infra, text accompanying notes 33, 149-56.
19. See infra, text accompanying note 116.

LAW

27 (1981).
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"pull" that the Roman-based notion of absolute, individual proprietas
could still exert. Lawyers' arguments began to suggest common assumptions that there must in every instance be someone who had the
property in a thing, who had that property without regard to where the
thing might be taken, and who had that property as against everyone
else in the world. Lawyers began to speculate about precisely when, in
the course of a transaction or by operation of law, the property in a
thing was changed or transmuted from one person to another. Toward
the end of the Year Book period, around 1500, lawyers began to argue
about old questions in new, property-based terms: disputes about hunting wild animals on other people's land, making new goods from other
people's materials, and harvesting crops in other people's fields.
The discussion of "property" in wild animals in a series of cases at
the turn of the sixteenth century showed most clearly the influence of
civil law terminology and ideas. In this context, English lawyers began
to offer accounts of the natural origin of individual property. The Year
Books from 1490 onward gave the first indications in English common
law discourse-the first since the earlier treatise tradition died out in
the thirteenth century-of a universal, abstract notion of "property
rights" or a "law of property" Here was a conceptual category with
enough content of its own to begin reorienting English legal thinking
toward assimilation of landholding, consumption of goods, and use of
animals. The English lawyers' most coherent, connected accounts of
the origin of property rights and property were found in newer, more
reflective forms of legal literature that began to appear in the sixteenth
century, in particular the popular dialogue DoctorandStudent by Christopher St. German.
By the start of the seventeenth century, treatises and handbooks for
students of the common law, the forerunners of Blackstone's Commentaries, brought land and goods under the general rubric of "property." In the fierce political debates and civil war that followed, lawyers
and laymen alike identified the crucial function of law to be to protect
"property" in this broader, more abstract, and more fundamental sense.
Out of the legal and political rhetoric of this period came Thomas
Hobbes's and John Locke's philosophical accounts of property and the
settled discourse of the later seventeenth-century lawyers, who regarded
a unitary, abstract, more or less absolute property right as a bedrock
element of their conceptual structure of law. This article examines the
absence of this broad "property" concept from common law discourse
for several centuries and its revival by late fifteenth- and sixteenthcentury lawyers.
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Property in the Early Common Law Treatises
"Property" was a fundamental and expansive notion in the earliest
manuscript accounts of common law courts in England. The treatise
known by the name of Glanvill, composed between 1187 and 1189, is
our first description of regular proceedings of the king's central law
courts conducted by professional judges and their clerks.2" A classification of the types of pleas the king's courts would hear formed the
organization of the treatise. All pleas, the reader first learned, were either
"criminal" or "civil" At the next level, Glanvill divided civil pleas into
two categories, "proprietary" and "possessory" 2' Both sets of distinctions were drawn from the terminology of Roman and canon law. After
the initial juxtaposition, the Roman terms for "proprietary" and "possessory" pleas were used sparingly in the remainder of the Glanvill
text." More often, Glanvill's explanatory categories were terms that a
reader might have understood as "native" equivalents of property and
possession, the words "right" (recto or iure) and "seisin "23
' Terms such
as "criminal," "civil," "proprietary," and "possessory" look familiar to
modern eyes, but in dividing royal pleas among those terms the author
made some curious choices. Debt was classified as property, and the
early "torts" -breach of the king's peace (trespass) and iniuria-came
under the heading of criminal pleas.24
The next great treatise on English common law, composed in the
second quarter of the thirteenth century and attributed to Henry de
Bracton, borrowed much more heavily from the conceptual framework
20. GLANVILL, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIAE (George E. Woodbine ed., 1932); THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND
COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., 1965). Subsequent citations
are to the Hall edition.

21. GLANVILL, supra note 20, at bk. 1, ch. 3, classified civil pleas for land in the
king's court as claims on the property (superproprietate)and claims on the possession
(superpossessione).
22. E.g., GLANVILL, supra note 20, at 6 (bk. 1, ch. 7, fol. 2v) (recto); id. at 132 (bk.
11, ch. 1, fol. 41) (recto); id. at 157 (bk. 13, ch. 13, fol. 48); id. at 158 (bk. 13, cli. 15,
fol. 48v); notes in Woodbine ed. at 262, 281-83. On some problems with the classification, see J.L. BARTON, ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND 9 & n.20 (Ius Romanum Medii
Aevi, vol. 5, pt. 13a, 1971).
23. GLANVILL, supra note 20, at 6 (bk. 1, ch. 7, fol. 2v) (de recto); id. at 43 (bk. 4,
ch. 1, fol. 13v) (lure); id. at 136 (bk. 12, ch. 1, fol. 42v); id. at 148 (bk. 13, ch. 1, fol.
45v). The word "seisin" was itself new in the last third of the twelfth century; earlier
documents used the verb forms "to seise" and "to be seised:' Id. at 192.
24. GLANVILL, supra note 20, at 4 (bk. 1, ch. 3, fol. 2); id. at 3 (bk. 1, ch. 2, fol. lv);
id. at 25 (bk. 2, ch. 3, fol. 8). See J.L. Barton, Bracton as a Civilian, 42 TuL. L. REv.
555, 566 n.51 (1968).
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of Roman law, and thereby added distinctions that might have seemed
"missing" to sophisticated readers of Glanvill.2 5 Like Justinian's Institutes, Bracton's treatise divided the subject-matter of law into persons,
things, and actions.26 The long and unfinished treatment of actions,
which accounted for the bulk of the treatise, repeated the juxtaposition
of the first two sections by distinguishing "real" and "personal" actions.
Actions for property or for possession were real (in rem) actions."
Personal (in personam) actions arose ex contractu, ex maleficio, or ex
28
delicto.
The crucial distinction, the one that formed the dominant vocabulary
of exposition for most sections of the treatise, was the division Bracton
made between real actions founded on property (superproprietate)and
those founded on possession (superpossessione).29In Bracton's extensive
commentary on the principal writs for the recovery of land, their scope,
and the procedures particular to each, the terms "property" and "possession" recurred so frequently that readers of the treatise must have
acquired an understanding of the distinction between them. In Bracton's
terms, what a rightful heir inherited was a "property right" (ius proprietatis) to land. 0 In the 1280s, the treatise known as Britton, an
abridged update of Bracton, rendered this Roman-based terminology
in French, contrasting propret of land with possessioun, and invoking
a dreit de propretP.'
25.
(G.E.
26.
27.

2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 294 (fol. 103)
Woodbine ed., S.E. Thorne trans., 1968-77).
Compare J. INST. 1.2.12 with 2 BRACTON, supra note 25, at 29 (fol. 4b).
Cf 2 BRACTON, supra note 25, at 318 (fol. 112b).

28. Id. at 290-95 (fols. 10lb-103).
29. Id. at 294, 296-97 (fols. 103, 104). See also 3 id. at 13 (fols. 159b-160). On the
classification of individual writs, see, e.g., 2 id. at 320-21 (fols. 113-113b); 3 id. at 18,
291, 325-26 (fols. 161, 270b, 283b-284); 4 id. at 21, 47 (fols. 317b, 327b).
30. 1 id. at 115-16; 2 id. at 24-25 (fol. 3); 4 id. at 350-51 (fols. 434b-435). In other
passages, Bracton equated possessory and proprietary right with the interests of the life

tenant and reversioner. 2 id. at 106 (fol. 32b); 3 id. at 13 (fol. 160). On the conceptual
separation between property and possession, see, e.g., 2 id. at 321 (fol. 113); see D.
41.2.12.1; WILLIAM OF DROGHEDA, SUMMA AUREA 357 (L. Wahrmund ed., 1914);
BRACTON AND Azo 208-9 (Selden Society Vol. 8). See also 3 BRACTON, supra note 25,
at 325 (fol. 284) (paraphrase); id. at 283 (fol. 267).
31. BRrTTON bk. 2, ch. 3, fols. 87, 89b (Francis Morgan Nichols ed. & trans., Oxford
1865); id. atbk. 2, ch. 8, fol. 101; id. atbk. 2, ch. 1'1, fol. 106b; id. atbk. 2, ch. 16, fol.
121b; id. at bk. 4, ch. 13, fol. 204; id. at bk. 3, ch. 22, fol. 217; id. at bk. 3, ch. 26, fol.

221b; id. at bk. 4, ch. 3, fol. 226; id. at bk. 4, ch. 6, fol. 233b; id. at bk. 4, ch. 8, fols.
235b-236; id. at bk. 6, intro., fol. 268 (1:221, 227, 257, 271-72, 311; 2:120, 153-54,
166-67, -178, 203, 209-10, 309). See also the problematic MIRROR OF JUSTiCES 57, 65,

67 (Selden Society Vol. 7) (chs. 16, 24, 25, droit de propriete).
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How is it that "property" in land, so well established in the centurylong treatise tradition, disappeared almost entirely in the Year Book
literature that succeeded the treatises? In the relatively few passages that
focused on interests in goods and animals-the only context in which
the later Year Book lawyers admitted of propret -Bracton favored the
Roman term dominium, not proprietas3 2 The overwhelming impression
left by Bracton's treatment of the "law of things," however, was that
most rules of ownership, its acquisition, and its transfer could be phrased
without reference to any distinction between land and other "things"
corporeal or incorporeal, that were capable of individual appropriation.
Under either Roman term, property was property.
The Year Books: Land and Chattels
The Breakfrom the Treatises
Manuscripts of Bracton and Britton were still being copied-by someone-when the new profession of advocates began to keep Year Books,
records of their dialogues with the justices of the king's central law
courts. Despite Bracton's incessant use of the Latin proprietasin reference to land and Britton's equivalent propret, I have found almost
no mention of property in land in the manuscript Year Books that have
so far made their way into printed editions, a more or less continuous
series from the 1290s to the end of the fifteenth century.33 Instead of
pairing "property" and "possession" of land, as the treatises had done,
" 34
Year Book lawyers spoke simply of "right" and "possession

This was part of a larger pattern. From the entire Roman conceptual
structure borrowed by Bracton to classify English common law, the first
Year Book lawyers regularly used only three terms as categories for
sorting out their learning: "real" and "personal" actions and "possessory" writs. The disappearance of the term "property" in reference to
land is all the more curious because, to any contemporary canonist or
civilian (Roman) lawyer, the English common lawyers' use of "possession" and "possessory actions" must have seemed to call out for its
32. 2 BRACrON, supra note 25, at 40-47, 127-29, 156, 158-59, 181, 184 (fols. 8-10b,
40b-41b, 51b, 52b, 61b, 62b).
33. For a few apparent exceptions in printed editions, not found in the original Year
Book manuscripts, see infra text accompanying notes 149-50.

34. See David J. Seipp, Bracton, the Year Books, and the "Transformation of Elementary Legal Ideas" in the Early Common Law, 7 LAw & HisT. REv. 175, 183-95,
200-201 (1989).
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natural counterpart, the opposite end of the stick: "property" in land.
Much later, in the sixteenth century, English common lawyers restored
most of the familiar terminology of the Romans, making basic conceptual building blocks of "public" and "private," "civil" and "criminal," "property" and "contract" law.
An obvious question, one that has been around for a long time and
remains far from resolution, is this: What use, if any, did Year Book
lawyers make of the earlier treatises? Glanvill was a century out of date,
Bracton nearly fifty years old, but Britton was current and, from the
number of manuscripts that survive, fairly popular among some readers
when the series of Year Books began. Monastic houses and cathedral
chapters, frequent litigants of the age, are the most likely source of the
bulk of treatise manuscripts that survive. Wouldn't there also have been
copies in the hands of the common lawyers? It is difficult to believe
that this new, secular profession of pleaders in the common law courts
lacked either the intelligence or the linguistic skills to exploit35any learning from the treatises that might have been useful to them.
The linguistic retreat frQm the full Roman terminology of Bracton
to the largely homegrown vocabulary of the Year Books strongly suggests
that the treatises formed no part of the basic education of new lawyers
joining the fledgling profession. If any of them encountered the learning
of Bracton or Britton as trained professional pleaders thereafter, they
would have found that these old authors emphatically associated the
term "property" with interests in land-a usage they did not share.
Year Book lawyers need not have concluded that this learning was
"inaccurate," however, nor changed their own terminology to conform
to it.
Here is one possible explanation. The older treatises, from Glanvill
onward, took the form of descriptions and interpretations, meant for
outsiders, of proceedings in the king's law courts. As such, the authors
deliberately used an "external" source of terminology, the only one
appropriate to the intended readership. Readers of the Glanvill and
Bracton treatises would have understood that they were seeing English
common law proceedings "translated" into what was for them a familiar
technical Roman vocabulary shared by civil and canon lawyers. Some
Year Book lawyers could perhaps have used the same vocabulary as
well, out of court and hence out of our earshot, to explain their strategies
35. For evidence of the common lawyers' acquaintance with the Bracton treatise
through 1300, see PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 11213 (1992); Paul Brand, Courtroom and Schoolroom: The Education of Lawyers in
England Prior to 1400, 60 HIsT. REs. 147, 163 (1987).
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to clients, particularly the ever-litigious bishops and abbots, who had
some elementary training in Roman law.36 But in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, these lawyers seem to have felt little need to explain
their learning to outsiders and less need to borrow prestige from the
learned (civil and canon) laws.
Yet this explanation does not go as far as it must. When "property"
dropped out of the Year Books for all references to land, no single term
denoting an interest in "things"-land and goods and animals-appeared to replace it. This was more than a matter of translating from
an external to an internal vocabulary. It was an important conceptual
change.
The English lawyers who contended against each other in the Year
Book reports would have used any promising argument to advance their
causes. If the broad and blunt proprietasof Bracton's treatise were of
any practical value to one side or another in any of the thousands of
reported contests over landholding entitlements, the lawyers would have
invoked it. In contests over entitlement to goods and domestic animals,
Year Book lawyers came to invest propret6 with much of the abstract,
conceptual force of the earlier proprietasand our later "property." These
quarrelsome Year Book pleaders of the later Middle Ages seem to have
agreed among themselves, however, that land and goods could not be
equated for such purposes under the "property" label or any other.
For goods and animals there was "property" and for land the comparable term in the Year Books was "right" (dreit). Lawyers classified
their writs regarding land into two sorts: writs "of possession" and writs
"of right?' In this scheme, "right" was "greater" or "higher" than possession. The word itself carried with it an absolute connotation: one
right, straight, true answer.3 7 The social context of landholding, however,
supplied the lawyers with a variety of questions about a variety of persons
who might have "right" of varying scope and nature in the same parcel
of land. The Year Book lawyers later elaborated this nesting set of
"rights" into the twin hierarchies of tenures and estates.38 Determining
this "right" to land and punishing breaches of the peace made up the
lion's share of business in the king's common law courts.
Goods, animals, and other interests collectively characterized as
"chattels" got far less attention than land in the early Year Books.
36.

RALPH

V.

TURNER, THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY IN THE AGE OF GLANvILL AND

1176-1239, at 150-51 (1985).
37. See Seipp, supra note 34, at 190-91.
38. The scheme was fully worked out in
1481).
BRACrON, C.

THOMAS LITTLETON, TENURES
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Lawyers applied the terminology of "property" to these things from the
outset, however, and retained it when cases involving chattels became,
over the next two centuries, a much larger part of the jurisdiction of
the common law courts. The differing terminology suggests differences
in the lawyers' perceptions of land and chattels. I will examine three
possible explanations: a "good feudal lawyer" thesis, a "devisability"
thesis, and an "interference" thesis. Only the last of these has broad
explanatory power for the sharp divergence in legal language.
The "Good Feudal Lawyer" Thesis
The "good feudal lawyer" explanation argues, in simplest terms, that
the Year Book lawyers got it right. As good feudal lawyers, they knew
that no English lord, tenant, or villein had any "property" interest in
land. Only the king, at the top of the feudal pyramid, had the absolute
property right to all the land in the realm, and everyone else merely
"held" land on condition of performance of services or payment of
rent.39 Thus Bracton was wrong, and any mention of "property"-if
understood to mean the highest and most complete interest in a thingwas as inappropriate for English land as it was appropriate for the goods
and animals the English owned outright. This point was made most
prominently in the first decade of the seventeenth century, and it was
made not by a common lawyer but by an eminent English civilian,
John Cowell.4" Cowell had the wit or luck to put this explanation in
one of the first examples of a new and useful sort of legal literature,
the law dictionary, from which it quickly entered the mainstream of
legal authorities.4
There are significant problems with this "good feudal lawyer" explanation. First of all, those who knew Roman law in the Middle Ages had
39. See, e.g., Mich. 18 Edw. 3, pl. 48, in Rolls Series at 157, 165 (1344) (there is no
land which is not held of another person until one comes to the King); Pasch. 20 Edw.
3, pl. 50, R.S. 1:339, 343 (1346); Jugement pl. 232 (1346) in ANTHONY FITZHERBERT,
LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGMENT (London 1514-16) (there was no land in England to which
the King had not in some way a right).
40. JOHN COWELL, INSTITUTIONES JURis ANGLICANI 2.2.2 (Cambridge 1605) (dominium); JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER, s.V. Property (Cambridge 1607). Despite his
disclaimers, Cowell himself wrote of proprietatein feodo simplici to denote fee simple
estates in land at English law, e.g., INSTITUTIONES, supra, at 236 (4.17.2). Reconciling
"absolute" property and feudal landholding remained a problem for Blackstone. Robert
P. Bums, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
67, 79-82 (1985).
41. G.E. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of 'Property' in Seventeenth-Century
England, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 97 (1980).
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no difficulty accommodating their inherited terms for absolute ownership,
dominium and proprietas, to a feudal world of relative rights.42 They
made distinctions, for example, between the lord's dominion (dominium
directum or ratione iurisdictioniset gubernationis)and the tenant's do43 English lawyers might
minion (dominium utile or rationeproprietas).
as easily split the two terms, reserving "dominion" for the lord's interest
(ultimately the king's) and propret6 for that of the tenant in possession
(or vice versa). In the mid-fourteenth century, an English theologian,
Richard Fitzralph, made just such a distinction between dominium and
proprietas." For the civilians, this sort of terminology did not resolve the
longstanding debate whether the emperor (or prince or king) had a
dominium eminens (our "eminent domain"), an ultimate ability to dispose of a subject's "property,"4 5 but it left in place the abstract notion of
"property in things"-land as well as other goods-held by the person
in immediate, rightful, and permanent possession.
In several respects, moreover, the English people had no more absolute
an interest in their goods and animals than they had in their land.
English lawyers explained in the Year Books how a person's "property"
in goods and animals was subject to, and quite capable of appropriation
by, feudal lords and the king. Forfeiture, outlawry, heriot, deodand, waif,
and estray all named situations in which such rights could be asserted.46
42. Also in Normandy on the eve of the Conquest, when charters referred to dominium and proprietasin laypersons' land, the terms applied to feudal holdings. EMILY
ZACK TABUTEAU, TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY IN ELEVENTH-CENTURY NORMAN LAW 9599, 107-9 (1988).
43. OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES 79, 178 n.271 (Frederic
William Maitland trans., 1900); 5 CARLYLE & CARLYLE, supra note 13, at 102; Janet
Coleman, Propertyand Poverty, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THOUGHT 607, 614 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988); John W. Cairns, Craig, Cujas, and the
Definition of Feudum: Is a Feu a Usufruct?, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROMAN LAW
OF PROPERTY 75-84 (Peter Birks ed., 1989); Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions
of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 700-703 & n.31, 706 (1938). Later English
lawyers employed the distinction, in, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 1,at 105; 2 ROBERT
CHAMBERS, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE ENGLISH LAW 85, 158 (Thomas M. Curley
ed., 1986).
44. Richard Fitzralph, De PauperieSalvatoris, bk. 1, ch. 2; bk. 4, chs. 1-2, in JOHN
WYCLIFFE, DE DOMINIO DIVINo 279-81,435-40, Wyclif Society no. 10 (Reginald Lane
Poole ed., London 1890) (c. 1350) (excerpts translated in 1 EWART LEWIS, MEDIEVAL
POLITICAL IDEAS 121-24 [1954]).
45. See GIERKE, supra note 43, at 179 n.271; J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 74 n.4 (1950).
46. See, e.g., Mich. 7 Edw. 4, pl. 16, fol. 18 (1467) (heriot custom entitled the lord
to take the villein's best beast at his death, even if the villein had sold it while alive).
Citations in this form are to the "Maynard" or "Vulgate" edition of 1679-80.
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In the words of Francis Bacon, a contemporary of John Cowell and a
better common lawyer, "no man is so absolute owner of his possessions"--goods and land alike-"but that the wisdom of the law does
reserve certain titles unto others?' 4 7
Finally, John Cowell, Francis Bacon, and other lawyers first articulated
this contrast between feudal arrangements and property at the same
time many lawyers (among them Cowell and Bacon) were applying the
term "property" to land and goods indiscriminately. Lawyers began to
refer to property in land when Tudor kings were reasserting their rights
to feudal revenues from land held in knight service, rights that remained
in force until 1660.48 Though it is thus both anachronistic and overly
formalistic to presume that medieval English lawyers shared the "good
feudal lawyer's" technical explanation of the distinction between land
and goods, the social dimensions of feudal landholding probably did
have a role to play in the conceptual split made by the Year Book
lawyers, as part of what I will call the "interference" thesis.
The "Devisability" Thesis
Land can be said to have differed from "chattels" in a number of
respects. The restriction of "property" terminology to the latter category
helped reinforce and maintain those differences. The distinction that
loomed largest in the arguments of the Year Book lawyers was the one
found in the rules for descent of an interest at the death of the holder.
Everything that would be inherited, that would vest automatically
in the heir, was assimilated to land. Except in a few localities, land in
England could not be devised by will until a statute permitted this in
1540.49 Landholders circumvented this rule by granting their land to
groups of friends on trust that they would regrant it after the grantor's
death to whomever the grantor named. What could be devised by will
were goods, domestic animals, and "chattels real" (leases of land for
years and some wardships)-in short, everything in which a person
could have "property." These passed to executors by testament or to
47. FRANCIS BACON, THE LEARNED READING ... UPON THE STATUTE OF USES (delivered 1600, first publ. London 1642), in 14 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 283, 319
(James Spedding et al. eds., Boston 1861).
48. Statute of Tenures, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24 (1660); A.R. Buck, The Politicsof Land Law
in Tudor England, 1529-1540, 11 J. LEG. HIsT. 200, 201 (1990).
49. A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 62, 139 (2d ed., 1986). See infra
text accompanying note 282. In the Anglo-Saxon period, it was possible to pass land
by will, but this was a late development and a rare practice, probably introduced by
the Church. MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 83-99 (1963).
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administrators in cases of intestacy, all under the supervision of the
church courts.
There was much less of a contrast in disposition during one's lifetime.
Both land and chattels were generally alienable." There is evidence of
active markets both for agricultural produce and for land, at least in
small holdings, in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries.51 One's ability
to buy and sell freehold land without the consent of one's lord was
recognized in the statute Quia emptores terrarum in 1290,52 just when
the term "property' so closely linked with alienability in later legal
contexts, disappeared from the common lawyers' vocabulary for land
transfers.
On its face, the important distinction between heritable land and
devisable chattels suggests that Year Book lawyers, either from the outset
or gradually over the decades, might have linked "property" most closely
to the ability to devise an interest at death, rather than the ability to
alienate during life or the certitude that an interest would form part of
53
the inheritance passing to the legally designated heir
A source for this link, if the link is there, could have been the common
lawyers' contact with canon law as it was administered by the church
courts of England in matters of succession to goods. Roman legal terminology suffused the writings of the medieval canonists in England, as
elsewhere in Europe. From the Year Book lawyers' point of view, the
church courts had everything to do with testaments of goods and nothing
to do with inheritance of land. Thus "property" so named, could have
come into the hands of executors, through a terminology shared by
canonists and common lawyers, while no such shared jurisdiction would
have extended "property" language to the heir of lands. A link to canonist
usage would help to explain why the term was applied only to devisable
chattels in the Year Books without positing any necessary conceptual tie
between the idea of devisability and the ascription of "property"
50. For both categories of holdings, however, individuals could sometimes place

restrictions on the terms of gifts in order to limit future alienation by the recipients.
51. See

CHRISTOPHER DYER, LORDS AND PEASANTS

IN A CHANGING SocIETY

51,

110-11 (1980);

ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM 124-30
(1978); R.H. TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 59-61,

78-80, 90-93 (1912).
52. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw. 1 (1290); see SIMPSON, supra note 49, at 54-

55.
53. R. Howard Bloch suggests that in late medieval France the link went entirely in
the opposite direction. Property (proprietas,propre) was equated with patrimony and
land, while goods, allied with money, did not connote property. R. HOwARD BLOCH,
ETYMOLOGIES AND GENEALOGIES: A LITERARY ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE FRENCH MIDDLE
AGES 73-74, 171-73 (1983).
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The chronology casts some doubt on this thesis. Lawyers found effective ways to get land to an intended beneficiary by means of the
"use," ancestor of the "trust" from the fourteenth century onward.
Lawyers began to ascribe property to land in the 1490s, long after the
practical evasion became common, and yet some half a century before
Parliament made lands devisable in 1540.54 After 1540, mentions of
property in land became common in the case reports, but again this
change in terminology cannot be simply a matter of church courts
taking jurisdiction over the transmission of land at death. In fact, church
courts did not extend their jurisdiction to land left by wills.55 The context
of sixteenth-century common lawyers' references to property in land
extended beyond the power to dispose of land by will. It encompassed
an assimilation of land to goods and animals on several fronts at once.
The "Interference" Thesis
The third explanation bears on the more direct and more obvious
ways in which land and chattels differed. Goods and animals were
"moveables" land "immovable" in the classification of Justinian, Bracton, and (very occasionally) the common lawyers. 6 A principal reason
Year Book lawyers found themselves talking about "property" was that
domestic animals (sometimes on their own account) and goods (usually
with help) strayed far from their rightful possessors, and were taken up
by others in distant places. A person's "property" in goods or animals
could continue despite lack of possession, control, or knowledge of their
whereabouts. 7 Land, by contrast, remained where one left it. The identity of the rightful holder of land was common knowledge to the surrounding population. Goods and animals required notional nametagsascriptions of "property" to some person, who might be unknown in
the county where the goods or animals were found.
Goods could be made and then consumed or destroyed, animals were
born and would perish, but the land remained indefinitely. The temporal
dimension posed problems for the ascription of "property" to goods and
animals. The common law frequently, and without too much discomfort,
left the holder of a "property" interest without a remedy to recover
specific goods or animals after they were wrongfully taken, even when
54. Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1 (1540).
55. R.H. HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW

IN REFORMATION

ENGLAND

1, 81-82

(1990).
56. See, e.g., J. INST. 2.6.pr, 2 BRACTON, supra note 25, at 39 (fol. 7b); Hil. 9 Hen.
6, pl. 16, fol. 63 (1432); see infra text accompanying note 173.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 75-82.
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they still existed and could be located. 8 When, by the absence of an
appropriate legal remedy or by the plaintiff's election of remedies, the
goods taken could not be recovered, Year Book lawyers stated without
hesitation that "property" had vested in the thief or the trespasser.5 9 Later,
notions that wrongdoers ought not acquire "property" in things by reason
of their wrongdoing helped push the common lawyers toward new remedies. Land, perhaps because it could always be recovered, because all
its remedies were, in this sense, "proprietary" - as earlier and later lawyers
would say-did not pose such puzzles.
Chattels could be consumed, destroyed, lost, or hidden. They could
be entirely appropriated, rightfully or wrongfully, by a single individual.
Land, in an important sense, could not. The conceptual distance between interests in land and interests in chattels, as they were treated in
Year Book arguments, might well have stemmed from differences those
lawyers perceived in the level of insecurity posed by interferences with
chattels, on the one hand, and interferences with land, on the other.
The Year Book cases that used the language of "property" painted a
portrait of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England in which people
resorted to litigation only in those rare circumstances when forcible
self-help was not satisfying.6" Goods and animals were taken and retaken, for all sorts of reasons and on all sorts of pretexts, quite often
to apply pressure to or exact recompense from a person who possessed
them. Complicating matters was the fact that possessors often found
themselves with goods and animals entrusted to them for safekeeping,
or sold by them and retained for later delivery, or assigned to them as
executors of a testamentary gift. Adversaries resorting to self-help seemed
to care as little about who had the "property" in things they took as
did ordinary thieves and trespassers.
Land was no less subject to self-help remedies and depredations, but
the effect of interference was much less drastic. Goods and chattels
could be lost forever in the course of private wars and disturbances.
Land could be taken and retaken countless times, it could be diminished
considerably in agricultural yield and in the rent it would produce for
a given year, but land could not perish completely. More importantly,
even in the best and most peaceful of times, many persons other than
58. Thus Maitland concluded that "the ownership of land was a much more intense

and completely protected right than was the ownership of a chattel." 2

FREDERICK

POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 153 (2d ed., Cambridge 1898).

59. See infra text accompanying notes 92-104.
60. This is a theme throughout J.G.

(1989).
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the "tenant in possession" would work and live on a given parcel of
land, and derive benefit from it. Many others would take some of its
produce, or simply make their way across it on the way to somewhere
else. Some had what were then legally cognizable rights of common,
profit, way, or tithe. Others had customary entitlements. Others had
social expectations of hospitality, charity, or neighborliness. The "tenant
in possession" could often be a character who never set foot on the
piece of land and received a fixed rent bearing only a tenuous relationship to the land's productive value.6 The image of one individual
owner, or even one family, excluding all others and taking all increase
from a parcel of land would have been a vast oversimplification, and
probably an unrecognizable image for holders of large or small parcels.62
Land had significance greater than the sum of its economic production
and use value. It is conventional to say that land was power in medieval
England. Land was also an important component of identity. Only a
certain limited set of interferences with land, only some "entries," actually threatened the position, income, or security of a tenant in possession. Many of the comings and goings upon and "takings" from land
were of little or no consequence to the freehold tenant or to the bailiff
in day-to-day supervision of the land. In contrast, every "taking" of
goods or animals threatened permanent loss of the entire value. Every
"possession" of goods and animals was potentially exclusive in a way
that "possession" of land would not ordinarily be. There was, in this
sense, a unitary interest in a horse or a book or a bolt of cloth. The
on-off, all-or-nothing character that "property" took on in Roman legal
texts and in Year Book debates was appropriate for the things that were
vulnerable to all interferences in a way that land was not.
There is one further respect in which scholars have hypothesized that
the treatment of land and chattels might have differed. Some have taken
the terminology of "property" to be an index of the development of
"individualism" in a society.63 On this scale, "property" would be found
61. Lords frequently converted service obligations to fixed money rents.

DYER,

supra

note 51, at 98-100.
62. Before the sixteenth century, the advantage of landholding lay not in the ability
to exclude everyone, but in the ability to raise a force of fighting men from among the
tenants sharing occupation of one's land. TAWNEY, supra note 51, at 188-90. Greater
prestige lay in lavish, conspicuous expenditures than in hoarding one's wealth. A.
Gurevich, Representationsof PropertyDuring the High Middle Ages, 6 ECON. & Soc'Y

1, 16-17, 21-22 (1977).
63. See, e.g., MACFARLANE, supra note 51, at 57-59. For earlier continental parallels,
see Paulo Grossi, La proprieta nel sistema privatistico della seconda scolastica, in LA
SECONDA SCOLASTICA NELLA FORMAZIONE DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO MODERNO
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in goods and animals to the extent that they were treated as wholly
within the control of single individuals. Land would not be termed
"property" insofar as it was treated as within the control of several
members of a family or of a wider community. This distinction is difficult
to test. Lawyers and others typically contrasted what was "property"
with what was held in "common" but the "right" that lawyers found
in land was also a right the lawyers attributed to a single individual.
English lawyers' usage focused on single individuals as the locus of
nearly all rights and duties, perhaps far more than nonlawyers would
have acknowledged.64
If lawyers' and litigants' perceptions of interests in and interferences
with land differed from their perceptions of interests in and interferences
with goods and animals, the difference would not only help explain the
narrowed context for "property" terminology in the lawyers' discourse,
but it would also help explain how that "property" terminology developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The statements that
Year Book lawyers framed in terms of "property" all in relation to
goods and animals, reached a level of abstract, theoretical consistency
that transcended the framework of the writs or "forms of action" in
which their arguments were set. By taking goods and animals, not land,
as their two paradigms of the "property" interest, the common lawyers
found it easier to borrow, use, and incorporate notions of "property"
as an absolute, individualistic, and "natural" (pre-legal or fundamental)
interest. When, over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the common lawyers expanded their "property" terminology to
include land, they reached once more for a higher set of abstractions
and followed once again the classical Roman model. In so doing, they
carried over the conceptual trappings of absolute property in goods and
animals into the context of land disputes, and changed the way future
generations of common lawyers would talk and think about this new
form of "property'

The Year Books: Property in Chattels
I have found just over 280 Year Book reports in which lawyers,
justices, or reporters used the term "property" in one French spelling
Grossi ed., 1973). It has been thought that early Roman society saw a similar transformation. RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND
SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 35-37 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., 3d ed., 1940).

64. See infra text accompanying notes 104, 105, 115-18.
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or another. At first, the term appeared very rarely: just two dozen such
reports turned up in the thirty-five volumes of Rolls Series and Selden
Society editions covering the first three decades of regular Year Book
reporting, 1290 to 1320. In all, the period from 1290 to 1370 accounted
for one-quarter of the cases, 1370 to 1440 roughly another quarter, and
the remaining half in steadily increasing frequency through the latter
part of Henry VI's reign, the reigns of Edward IV, Richard III, Henry
VII, and the few years of Henry VIII's reign found in printed editions
of the Year Books. Talk of "property" then continued unabated in some
seventy cases found in the published sixteenth-century reports of John
Caryll, Robert Brooke, James Dyer, Edmund Plowden, and others, and
in the recently published editions of reports of John Spelman and John
Port.
Much could be written about the detailed doctrinal development of

this property interest in chattels-indeed, much has been written.65 My
purpose instead is to sketch some of the broader assumptions and

conceptions evidenced by this increasing use of "property" terminology.
What follows is a synthesis of usage and context, of arguments and
assertions recorded by and for professional lawyers, not of official holdings of the courts.66

Certain aspects of property terminology persisted throughout the Year
Book period: in particular, the abstract level of the lawyers' arguments
about "property" the sharp distinction between "property" in goods
and actual physical possession, the ease with which the lawyers ascribed
"property" to thieves and trespassers, and the difficulty the lawyers had
in locating the "property" of church goods and goods of deceased
testators. After 1400 new notions began to appear in the Year Books,
notions of absolute and relative property, of the acquisition of property
65. See, e.g., EW. Maitland, The Seisin of Chattels, 1LAw Q. Rev. 324 (1885); James
Barr Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 23, 313, 337 (1890); Percy
Bordwell, Propertyin Chattels, 20 HARV. L. REv. 374, 501, 731 (1916); Maurice Finkelstein, The Plea ofPropertyin a Strangerin Replevin, 23 COLuM. L. REV. 652 (1923);
H.D. Hazeltine, Gossip About Legal History: UnpublishedLetters ofMaitlandandAmes,
2 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1, 10-17 (1924); S.EC Milsom, Sale of Goods in the FifteenthCentury,
77 LAW Q. REV. 257 (1961); J.H. Baker, Introduction, Fn 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN
SPELMAN 209-20 (Selden Society Vol. 94, 1977).
66. The Year Books are a better source for studying conventional legal usage than
for pinning down authoritative legal doctrine. Reporters recorded successful and unsuccessful pleading strategies, but often omitted the results of the cases. See David J.
Seipp, Roman Legal Categories in the Early Common Law, in LEGAL RECORD AND
HISTORICAL REALITY 9, 17 (Thomas G. Watkin ed., 1989). For a study of late twentieth-

century "property" discourse in American state supreme court decisions, see Donahue,
supra note 8, at 48-55.

Concept of Property
in things taken from land and in wild animals captured, tamed, or
killed. Finally, we catch the first few glimpses of property in land.

Property in the Abstract
Year Book lawyers phrased their pronoucements about "property"
in terms broad and abstract enough to fit all goods and domestic animals
whatsoever. Readers of a Year Book report would often learn nothing
at all about the specific material objects or animals in dispute: reporters
merely noted down that the lawyers made their arguments about unspecified "goods" (biens), animals (avers or bestes), or chattels. In this
respect, the treatment of goods and animals as objects of litigation
resembled the treatment of persons as subjects of litigation. Abstract,
anonymous ciphers populate the Year Books: a faceless "plaintiff," "defendant" "John at Style;' "one Alice," and so forth. Whatever influence
the actual identity of these persons carried in the pleading and trial of
their own lawsuits, for readers of the Year Books they could be anyone
from the Archbishop of Canterbury to the poorest cottager's widow.
The lawyers' use of abstractions in describing persons who might hold
property is a more telling aspect of the Year Book discussions than their
habit of speaking abstractly about the "things" that could be held as
property. Notions of formal equality in law were thereby communicated
to future generations of lawyers who took the Year Books as their model
for lawyerly argument. In relation to "things'" the abstract level of
argument tended to assimilate a broad range of tangible objects and
intangible interests to the twin paradigms of the typical goods and the
typical domestic animals. "Suppose I sell you my horse" was the usual
opening gambit in any number of Year Book arguments about "property" in any number of objects. Land, in this respect, resisted the
relentless abstracting tendencies of the Year Book reporters a bit more.
The lawyers recognized important differences in the legal treatment of
individual parcels of land by location (ancient demesne, particular boroughs, Kentish gavelkind land) and, to a lesser extent, by use (grants
of forest, wood, manor).
Two paradigms -specific goods and domestic animals-set the terms
of Year Book debate about what "property" meant. Lawyers analogized
from these instances to the other sorts of "chattels" that appeared,
infrequently, in Year Book cases mentioning the term. Throughout the
Year Book period, English common lawyers had no difficulty finding
"property" in money and undifferentiated goods (such as grain and
wine), and in creditors' rights to payment of debts-though some balked
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at the notion of "property" in a fire or in wild animals.67 They ascribed
"property" with equal facility to the interests they categorized as "chattels real," including leases of land for terms of years and certain wardships of minors, and to the right to hold markets or fairs.68 From the

mid-fourteenth century and increasingly in the fifteenth century, they
recognized "property" in houses, trees, grain, grass, and minerals affixed
to land but capable of sale and of removal from the land, as chattels,
by a purchaser or a trespasser. 9 Lawyers in all these contexts made the
same types of "property" arguments that served them in over 250 cases
where goods and animals were in dispute.
I did not find any instance in the Year Books of lawyers talking about
an individual's "property" in that person's own self, body, life, liberty,
or labor, though this language began to appear in the late seventeenth
century.7" Nor did I find any report in which a lawyer referred to

"property" in a spouse or child, though again seventeenth-century lawyers could frame such a question. 7' A single case of 1406 did report a

67. Pasch. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 16, 43 Selden Society 114 (1313) (Russell); Kent Eyre, 6-7
Edw. 2, 27 Selden Society 28 (1313-14) (Ingham); Mich. 17 Edw. 3, pl. 78, R.S. 357
(1343); Pasch. 1 Hen. 7, pl. 2, fol. 14, 15 (1486); Mich. 20 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 1 (1504);
Woodward v. Darcy, 1 Plowden 184, 185, 75 Eng. Rep. 285 (1558). But see Pasch. 7
Hen. 4, p1. 3, fol. 39 (1406) (no property in unpaid debt obligation); Mich. 21 Hen. 7,
pl. 2, Keilway 69, 72 Eng. Rep. 229 (1506) (no property in undesignated barley). On
fires, Pasch. 2 Hen. 4, p1. 6, fol. 18 (1401). But see Paramour v. Yardley, 2 Plowden
542, 75 Eng. Rep. 799 (1579). See infra text accompanying notes 139-44.
68. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 50, 17 Selden Society 105 (1308-09); 4 Edw. 2, pl. 3, 42 Selden
Society 173 (1310-11); Pasch. 17 Edw. 2, fol. 543 (1324); Trin. 14 Edw. 3, pl. 37, R.S.
277, 279 (1340); Hil. 15 Edw. 3, pl. 26, R.S. 313 (1341); Pasch. 12 Edw. 4, pl. 25, fol.
10 (1472); Pasch. 10 Edw. 4, pl. 1, fol. 1 (1470); Hales v. Petit, 1 Plowden 253, 259, 75
Eng. Rep. 396 (1562).
69. Hil. 18 Edw. 3, pl. 47, RS 629 (1344); Hil. 19 Edw. 3, pl. 23, R.S. 465, 467 (1345);
Mich. 11 Hen. 4, pl. 59, fol. 32 (1409); Mich. 6 Edw. 4, p1 . 18, fol. 7 (1466); Trin. 7
Edw. 4, pl. 5, fol. 13, 14 (1467); Hil. 18 Edw. 4, p1. 1, fol. 21, 1 (1479); Trin. 21 Hen.
7, pl. 5, fols. 27, 28 (1506); 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 65, at
3 (Accion sur le Case pl. 3) (1522).
70. Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan 330, 337, 124 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1102 (1673). See supra
note 14 and infra text accompanying notes 267-68. See also, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON,
PROPERTY: CRITICAL AND MAINSTREAM POSITIONS 7 (1978). Cf RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 16 (1979) (suggesting

this was a pervasive notion before the seventeenth century). Although proprete did not
refer to one's person, the related term propre, meaning one's "own;' appeared most
frequently in the Year Books in two contexts: appearing "personally" in court (en propre
person) and holding goods for one's own use (come propre biens). We retain this sense
of one's "proper" identity in our distinction between proper nouns and common nouns.
71. See, e.g., Barham v. Dennis, Cro. Eliz. 770,78 Eng. Rep. 1001 (C.P. 1601); Thomas
v. Sorrell, Vaughan 330, 339, 124 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1103 (1673). See infra text accompanying notes 264-65.
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lawyer phrasing the issue of free or unfree status of a claimed villein
as "trying the property" in analogy to a similarly worded writ regarding
claims to recover animals.72 Notes of arguments on hypothetical cases
mooted in the Inner Temple in the 1490s record law students or lawyers
speaking of lords having property in the bodies of their villeins and of
guardians having property in the bodies of their wards.73 Nonetheless,
it is fair to say that persons themselves and their personal capacities
(except in the sense of the debtor's repayment of a sum of money) did
not form a paradigm or even a noticeable instance of the language of
"property" in the courtroom.7 4
Property to Non-Possessors
However abstract their discussions, Year Book lawyers did not speak
in a way that equated "property" with its object, as modem usage does.
Lawyers did not say that "the horse was your property" but rather that
"the property of the horse was to (or at, or with, or of) you " '5 "Property"
was uniformly an attribute of the goods or chattels in question, not
another way of talking about the objects themselves. If a thief took my
goods, that was one thing, but if a thief acquired the property in them,
that was quite another. I do not join with the philosopher C. B. Macpherson in reading this "property" attribute in the Year Books simply
as a "right" in the limited sense of "an enforceable claim to some use
72. Mich. 8 Hen. 4, Retourne pl. 31, in [NICHOLAS STATHAM], EPITOME ANNALIUM
LIBRORUM TEMPORE HENRICI SEXTI fOl. 157b (1406) (Ist publ. London, c. 1490). In
1346, in a replevin action for return of distrained animals, the defendant claimed himself
to be a monk and the plaintiff to be the abbot's villein. The plaintiff responded that a
monk could not have proprete de villein. Mich. 20 Edw. 3, pl. 32, 2 R.S. 305 (1346).
This may have meant either "property in a villein" or "property in a villein's goods."
Other cases describe lords "seised" of their villeins. Mich. 3 Edw. 3, pl. 14, fol. 38

(1329).
73. Arguments in the Inner Temple, MS. Harley 1691, Case 22 (fol. 26v), 105 Selden
Society 136 (propertye en lour corps); Case 33 (fol. 32), 105 Selden Society 147 (propertye
de corps). Cf Case 28, 105 Selden Society 141 (lord's loyall interest en le corps of villein).
74. Bracton did not consider villeins the "chattels" of their lords, or as "slaves" in
relation to anyone else but their lords. Bracton preferred to write that villeins were in
the power (potestas) of their lords. See PAUL R. HYAMS, IING, LORDS AND PEASANTS
IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE COMMON LAW OF VILLEINAGE IN THE TWELFTH AND

90-96 (1980). Earlier sources indicate that villeins could be
bought and sold like domestic animals. See id. at 3-5. See also 2 CHAMBERS, supra
note 43, at 106.
75. The common Year Book usage is proprete a someone. I have rendered the law
French phraseology in this form: "the property in the goods was to or with a certain
THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

person."
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or benefit of something "'7 6 Attribution of "property" brought with it a
great many advantages but some disadvantages as well-a full complement of rights, powers, duties, and liabilities. To have the property
of goods and animals meant, in many instances, to lose the beneficial

use of them in circumstances of attaint, forfeiture, attachment, execution, heriot, mortuary, and the like."
In many of the common contexts of property discussion in the Year
Books, the property of goods or animals was with one person at a time
when another person had them actually in hand. In the typical bailment,
an extremely common arrangement, a bailor retained the property in
goods that he or she had entrusted to the safekeeping of a bailee.78 In
the typical distraint, an extremely common form of self-help, a lord
seized a tenant's domestic animals in order to compel the tenant to
perform services or pay rent in arrears, but the tenant retained property
in the animals held by the lord.79 In a sale of goods or animals, the
property passed to a buyer as soon as a definite contract was made,
and a seller retained the bare custody until delivery took place.8" When
one person leased a domestic animal to another for a period of time,
the property remained with the lessor." When a landholder impounded
a stray animal, the property remained with the original possessor.8"
76.

MACPHERSON, supra note 70, at 3.
77. See, e.g., Trin. 18 Edw. 3, p1. 4, R.S. 231 (1344) (heriot); Trin. 12 Ric. 2, pl. 2,
Ames 3, 4; STATHAM, supra note 72, Distresse pl. 3 (1388) (attaint); Mich. 13 Ric. 2,
pl. 3, Ames 35; pl. 4, Ames 37 (1389) (mortuary); Mich. 13 Hen. 4, pl. 5, fol. 2 (1411)
(execution); Mich. 7 Edw. 4, pl. 16, fol. 18 (1467) (heriot); Trin. 20 Hen. 7, pl. 2, Keilway
61, 63, 72 Eng. Rep. 223 (1505) (forfeiture); Woodland v. Mantel, 1 Plowden 94, 95,
75 Eng. Rep. 152 (1553) (heriot). Cf Fair Court of St. Ives, 23 Selden Society 83 (1311)
(attachment).
78. Mich. 47 Edw. 3, pl. 55, fol. 23 (1373); Mich. 48 Edw. 3, pl. 8, fol. 20 (1374);
Hil. 14 Hen. 4, pl. 37, fol. 27 (1413); Pasch. 7 Hen. 6, pl. 24, fol. 31 (1429); Mich. 2
Edw. 4, pl. 26, fol. 25 (1465); Hil. 18 Edw. 4, pl. 5, fol. 23 (1479); Mich. 22 Edw. 4, pl.
10, fol. 29, 30 (1482).
79. E.g., Trin. 2 Hen. 5, pl. 9, fol. 10 (1414); see infra text accompanying notes 11017.
80. Trin. 21 Hen. 6, pl. 12, fol. 55 (1443); Mich. 22 Hen. 6, pl. 50, fol. 33 (1443);
Hil. 49 Hen. 6, pl. 4, 47 Selden Society 163 (1471); Pasch. 17 Edw. 4, pl. 2, fol. 1 (1477);
Hil. 18 Edw. 4, pl. 1, fols. 21, 1 (1479); Hil. 21 Hen. 7, pl. 4, fol. 6 (1506); Hil. 21 Hen.
7, pl. 30, fol. 18 (1506); Port's Notebook, 102 Selden Society 109 (1523).
81. Mich. 1 Edw. 4, pl. 18, fol. 9 (1461) (Yelverton).
82. Estray (property passed to the taker after a year and a day): Hil. 31 Edw. 3,
STATHAM, supra note 72, Estray pl. 1, fol. 79a (1357); Hil. 39 Edw. 3, pl. [14], fol. 4
(1365); Pasch. 7 Hen. 6, pl. 21, fol. 27, 28 (1429); Mich. 20 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 1 (1504).
Damage feasant: 27 Lib. Ass. p1. 64, fol. 143 (1353); Pasch. 12 Edw. 4, p1. 25, fol. 10
(1472); Mich. 7 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 16 (1491); Mich. 13 Hen. 7, pl. 11, fol. 10 (1497).
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Property to Husbands
Another instance of the separation of "property" from actual pos-

session, effective control, and beneficial use arose within the marriage
relationship. As far as the common law courts were concerned, husbands
had the "property" of all goods and animals their wives brought into
the marriage or acquired while married.83 Wives could not, without
their husbands' continuing assent, direct the disposition of goods or
animals at death." In contrast, married women's interests in lands,
though limited, were not denied altogether." In matters of "property,"
England's "unfree persons" were in a better position than married
in goods and animals until the lord
women: villeins held 8property
6
decided to seize them.
Most of the cases in which lawyers tried (vainly) to assert a "property"

interest for married women came in the first three decades of Year
Book reporting. This suggests that the simple, uniform, abstract rule of
"property" to husbands did not at first reflect every litigant's expectations. In the later Year Books, the point was rarely made, probably
because lawyers knew not to frame pleadings in the name of married
women. 7 I do not know when the English Chancellors began enforcing
"uses" or "trusts" of goods and money for the benefit of married women,
83. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 4b, 20 Selden Society 67 (1310) (Stanton); Mich. 4 Edw. 2,
p1. 44,22 Selden Society 150 (1310); Kent Eyre, 6-7 Edw. 2, 27 Selden Society 28 (131314) (Ingham); Mich. 12 Edw. 2, pl. 31, 65 Selden Society 42 (1318); Mich. 12 Edw. 2,
pl. 39, 65 Selden Society 56 (1318); Pasch. 17 Edw. 2, fol. 543 (1324); Trin. 14 Edw. 3,
pl. 37, R.S. 277, 279 (1340); Hil. 15 Edw. 3, pl. 26, R.S. 313 (1341); Trin. 16 Edw. 3,
pl. 72, R.S. 245 (1342); Trin. 33 Edw. 3, STATHAM, supra note 72, Replegiare pl. 4, fol.
161a (1359); Pasch. 21 Edw. 4, pl. 7, fol. 4 (1481) (Littleton); OLD NATuRA BREVIUM
at fol. 34 (late 14th c. MS, first publ. London c. 1518); Robert Constable, Reading at
Lincoln's Inn, 71 Selden Society 229 (1489); Moot Case from Barnard's Inn, c. 14801500, 105 Selden Society clxxiii, clxxxix. Cf Mich. 2 Hen. 4, pl. 51, fol. 12 (1400) (wife
gave property in goods to chaplain as against husband); Mich. 22 Hen. 6, STATHAM,
supra note 72, Corone pl. 39, fol. 57a (1443); Mich. 33 Hen. 6, pl. 4, fol. 31 (1454).
84. Mich. 30 Edw. 1, R.S. 31 (1302) (Friskeney); Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 48, 63 Selden
Society 240 (1311) (Herle); Pasch. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 16,43 Selden Society 114 (1313) (Russell);
Trin. 12 Hen. 7, pl. 2, fol. 22-24 (1497).
85. See, e.g., 2 Edw. 2, pl. 62, 17 Selden Society 128 (1308-09) (Hengham).
86. 21 Edw. 1, R.S. 107 (1293); Hil. 19 Edw. 3, pl. 32, R.S. 501 (1345); Mich. 19
Edw. 3, pl. 79, R.S. 473, 477 (1345); Trin. 33 Edw. 3, STATHAM, supra note 72, Replegiare
pl. 4, fol. 161a (1359); Pasch. 35 Edw. 3, id. at Villenage pl. 8, fol. 187a (1361); Mich.
18 Hen. 6, pl. 7, fol. 22 (1439).
87. Some exceptions are Mich. 7 Hen. 6, pl. 6, fols. 1, 2 (1428); Hil. 21 Hen. 6, pl.
16, fol. 30 (1443).
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or how widely such devices were used before the seventeenth century."
Other evidence, however, particularly in collections of medieval wills,
suggests that women had more control over disposition of goods and
animals than the common law admitted. 9
English canonists had long differed with the common lawyers, upholding the right of married women to make valid bequests of goods
in a series of ecclesiastical statutes from 1240 to 1342. In 1430, William
Lyndwood summed up the canonists' case for wives to dispose of their
"own" (propriae)clothing and other personal effects, their "paraphernalia," by testament.9" On the Continent, medieval civilians ascribed
property in other goods to the husband, but unlike the common lawyers
they had a term for the wife's "lesser" interest in goods. A leading
fourteenth-century civilian distinguished the dominium proprietatisof
the husband from the dominium utile or dominium directum of the
wife.9' The common lawyers' rule was more absolute and unaccommodating than the formulations of the learned lawyers in the universities.

Property to Thieves
When one person wrongfully took goods or animals from another,
did the "property" remain with the original possessor or pass to the
one who took? Perhaps the most puzzling usage of "property" terminology in the Year Books-puzzling for modem readers-arose in the
contexts of takings of goods by felony and by trespass. An early report
suggested that a felon acquired the "property" in stolen goods, an odd
notion now but one that accorded with the determination in that case
that after indictment and conviction the felon's goods (including those
proved to have been stolen) were forfeit to the king or lord.92 By the
1470s, however, lawyers were of the opinion that property in goods did
88. See SUSAN

STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN'S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN ENGLAND,

1660-

1833, at 29, 35 (1990).

89. See M.M. Sheehan, The Influence ofCanon Law on the PropertyRights ofMarried
Women in England, 25 MEDIEVAL STUD. 109, 121-22 (1963); Ann J. Kettle, 'My Wife
Shall Have It" Marriageand Property in the Wills and Testaments of Later Medieval
England,in MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY 89, 94-96 (Elizabeth M. Craik ed., 1984).
90. WILLIAM LYNDWOOD, PROVINCIALE SEU CONSTITUTIONES ANGLIAE

173 (Oxford

1679) (gloss on propriarum uxorum); Sheehan, supra note 89, at 119-20.

91. See Jacques Pluss, Baldusde Ubaldisof Perugiaon Dominium over DotalProperty,
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 399, 409 (1984).
92. Hil. 8 Edw. 3, pl. 30, fol. 10, 11 (1334).
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not pass to the felon, but remained with the original possessor.93 The
victim's continuing property in the stolen goods made theft a continuing
offense. One result was that an indictment could be brought in any
county to which the thief had carried the goods." On the other hand,
if the thief sold the stolen goods in "market overt" to an innocent
buyer, property passed from the original possessor to the buyer "by
operation of law"'9 5 Forfeiture of stolen goods could be reasoned the
96

same way.

Property to Trespassers
The common lawyers persisted much longer in stating that a person
sued in trespass for taking another's goods acquired property in the
goods by the wrongful taking. 97 The trespass remedy was limited to
damages. Thus, by suing in trespass, the plaintiff could not recover the
specific goods taken. 98 If the plaintiff no longer had the property, the
defendant must. 99 In a singular Year Book report of 1490, the lawyers
disputed whether the original possessor retained the property of taken
goods or acquired a mere "right of property" With a bare "right of
property," the victim of a trespass could not, for example, make a valid
93. Mich. 13 Edw. 4, p1. 7, fol. 3 (1473); Pasch. 4 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 5 (1489); Mich.
2 Hen. 8, Keilway 160, 72 Eng. Rep. 335 (1511). Cf Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, fol. 9, 10 (1474);
Argument in the Inner Temple, Case 33, 105 Selden Society 147 (c.
1490s). For a lawyers'
conundrum, see Trin. 7 Hen. 7, pl. 18, fol. 43 (1492) (a bailor could be hanged for
stealing his own property from his bailee).
94. Pasch. 4 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 5 (1489).
95. Hil. 33 Hen. 6, p1. 15, fol. 5 (1455); Mich. 35 Hen. 6, pl. 33, fol. 25, 29 (1456);
Pasch. 5 Hen. 7, pl. 11, fol. 18 (1490); Mich. 20 Hen. 7, pl. 21, fol. 11, 12 (1504); Port's
Notebook, 102 Selden Society 106 (n.d.); Willion v. Berkley, I Plowden 223, 244, 75
Eng. Rep. 372 (1562); JOHN PERKINS, A PROFITABLE BOKE sec. 93 at 20D (London
1528; 15th ed., London 1827).
96. Port's Notebook, 102 Selden Society 109 (n.d.).
97. Mich. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 38, 34 Selden Society 142 (1312) (trespass & replevin suppose
plaintiff out of property); London Eyre, 14 Edw. 2,86 Selden Society 133 (1321) (plaintiff
asserts defendant claims property, defendant appropriated the property); Pasch. 19 Hen.
6, pl. 5, foL. 65 (1441) (property in taker); Mich. 2 Edw. 4, pl. 8, fol. 16 (1462) (Littleton);
Hil. 21 Edw. 4, [pl. 6, fol. 74,] Brooke's Abridgement, Trespass pl. 358 (1483) (Brooke's
note only); Mich. 6 Hen. 7, pl. 4, fol. 7, 8, 9 (1490); Argument in the Inner Temple,
Case 33, 105 Selden Society 147 (c. 1490s).
98. Although trespass was limited to damages, plaintiffs saw considerable advantages
in this type of writ. In an action of trespass, the defendant was subject to arrest, and
if the plaintiff prevailed, the defendant was subject to imprisonment until he satisfied
the judgment.
99. See, e.g., Hil. I Hen. 5, pl. 4, fol. 3 (1414).
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gift of the goods taken."° Two years later, another lawyer took the
position that the "owner" had the property, not the wrongdoer.' (The
English term "owner," itself an important measure of developing "property" notions, was slowly making its appearance in the Year Books at
this time. 102)
It is tempting to say that the lawyers who ascribed "property" to the
trespasser were simply tailoring their property concept to fit whichever
of the writs or "forms of action" they happened to be using. What was
"property" to one person in a trespass suit might be "property" to
another person in a different type of proceeding on the same facts.
Indeed, many passages in the Year Books explained that the writ of
trespass differed from the writs of replevin, detinue, debt, and the appeal
of robbery in that plaintiffs bringing writs of trespass "supposed" or
"affirmed" that they no longer had the property in the goods or animals
taken.'0 3 Even in this respect, however, fifteenth-century common lawyers did not fragment their talk of "property" to fit it into tight procedural compartments.
In trespass, as in other actions, Year Book lawyers employed an
expansive scope of analogy for their arguments, reasoning freely from
"property" in one type of action to "property" in another. True, pleading
rules and the limits of available remedies occasionally bedeviled the
Year Book lawyers' efforts to make consistent use of their ascriptions
of "property" in goods and animals. In actions of trespass, however,
lawyers resisted the implication that plaintiffs could lose the "property"
in goods, long after a taking, at the moment they chose to proceed with
100. Mich. 6 Hen. 7, p1. 4, fol. 7, 8, 9 (1490) (droit del propriete).
101. Trin. 10 Hen. 7, pl. 13, fol. 27 (1492) (on dating, see 102 Selden Society 151
n.2). Cf Pasch. 12 Edw. 4, p1. 25, fol. 10 (1472) (property was always to plaintiff).
102. Mich. 11 Hen. 4, pl. 46, fol. 23 (1409) (sheep); Pasch. 12 Edw. 4, pl. 22, fol. 8,
9 (1472) (market); Pasch. 4 Hen. 7, pl. 9, fol. 8 (1489); Hil. 16 Hen. 7, pl. 3, fol. 4, 5
(1501); Mich. 18 Hen. 7, pl. 2, Keilway 46, 72 Eng. Rep. 204 (1502) (land); Colthirst
v. Bejushin, 1 Plowden 23, 35, 75 Eng. Rep. 56 (1550); Mich. 15 & 16 Eliz., pl. 2, 3
Dyer 326b, 73 Eng. Rep. 738 (1573). These uses coincide with mentions of "owners"

in statutes and parliamentary records. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55.
103. HiT. 8 Hen. 6, pl. 17, fol. 27 (1430); Mich. 22 Hen. 6, pl. 26, fol. 15 (1443);
Mich. 22 Edw. 4, pl. 10, fol. 29, 30 (1482); Mich. 2 Ric. 3, pl. 39, fol. 14 (1484); Pasch.
4 Hen. 7, pl. 1,fol. 5 (1489); Mich. 14 Hen. 7, pl. 22, fol. 12, 13 (1498); Port's Notebook,
102 Selden Society 151 (n.d.). Conversely, defendants who did not wish to deny the
entirety of their plaintiffs' claims for trespass to goods had to give "color" to the plaintiffs'
claims by confessing (in what came to be a legal fiction) that the plaintiffs once had
property in the goods or animals taken. See Donald W. Sutherland, Legal Reasoning
in the Fourteenth Century: The Invention of "Color" in Pleading,in ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE 182, 183-84 (Morris
S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981) (color originated in novel disseisin).
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trespass rather than another remedy. Instead, the lawyers reached the
conclusion that the "property" must have passed to the trespasser at
the time of the taking. What emerges from the body of Year Book cases
on "property" is an assumption that the common law could give consistent, substantive descriptions of "who had the property" in the world
outside of the courtroom. Later lawyers and political writers would take
for granted that property existed independently of the particular forms
of action that might be used in an English court. They would dispute
whether this property in things of the world predated all government
and all human laws."°
Property to Churches
Throughout the Year Book period, the common lawyers found it
difficult to adapt their "property" terminology to two situations that
straddled their jurisdictional boundary with the church courts of England: church goods and goods of deceased persons in the hands of
executors. The lawyers' puzzlement in these situations suggests that if
canon law was a source of "property" terminology in the Year Books,
it was a problematic one. Canonists themselves had difficulty in applying
an absolute, individual "property" notion to the goods and lands of a
church.' 5 When the common law courts saw writs that ascribed property
in goods to a parish church or chapel, a monastery, or a priory, some
lawyers objected that such entities could not have "property" in anything.' 6 Others pointed out the difficulty of ascribing property to the
churchwardens, parsons, vicars, abbots, and priors personally.'07 Any of
these positions could be vacant for long periods of time. Faced with
the impossibility of finding property with anyone when the position of
abbot or prior was vacant, the lawyers were driven to conclude that
104. See infra text accompanying notes 204-13 (St. German), 222-26 (Fortescue),
234 (Coke). This was also a theme in seventeenth-century political writing.
105. BRIAN TIERNEY, MEDIEVAL POOR LAW: A SKETCH OF CANONICAL THEORY AND

ITS APPLICATION IN ENGLAND 39-43 (1959). Before the twelfth century, some considered
the patron saint of the church, or the church building itself, as the holder of the property
interest. Later views ascribed the property to Christ, to the whole community of the

clergy, or to the entire body of the Christian faithful.
106. Trin. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 32, 42 Selden Society 134 (1311); Trin. 18 Edw. 3, pl. 4, R.S.

231 (1344); Mich. 47 Edw. 3, pl. 55, fol. 23 (1373); Argument in the Inner Temple,
Moot Case 21, 105 Selden Society 135 (c. 1490s).
107. Hil. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 357 (1305); Mich. 11 Hen. 4, pl. 25, fol. 12 (1409); Trin.

9 Hen. 6, pl. 21, fol. 25 (1431); Pasch. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 10, fol. 66 (1441).

58

Law and History Review

property could reside with an ecclesiastical institution.10 8 One working
assumption-that "property" ought to belong to an individual living
human being-had come into conflict with another-that at any given
time the "property" had to be somewhere.
Property to Executors
Year Book lawyers faced another persistent puzzle when they attempted
to determine whether executors had the "property" in goods of a deceased
testator. If executors had the "property" in goods, there were suddenly
many circumstances that could frustrate the testator's directions when,
for example, the unmarried executrix took a husband, or the felonious
executor forfeited everything. If the executors did not have the "property,"
there were suddenly many suits they could not bring to recover the goods
or their value. Moreover, if the executors did not have the "property"
the alternative was to ascribe it to the dead testator. Lawyers long disagreed
on this point, some quite willing to contend that property remained with
the dead."° Their running dispute illustrated how the term "property"
left little room for maneuver. One person or another had to have it; a
great deal followed from the determination.
Property in Replevin
Defendants "claiming property" in the action of replevin provided
the single most frequent use of the term in the Year Books from the
1290s through the late sixteenth century. Replevin, as originally conceived, was an action to recover domestic animals wrongfully "dis108. Mich. 7 Edw. 4, pl. 1, fol. 14 (1467); Mich. 9 Edw. 4, pl. 9, fol. 33, 34 (1469).

The common lawyers had less trouble finding property in guilds and other bodies
corporate. Pasch. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 10, fol. 66 (1441).
109. Property in executors: Hil. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 357 (1305); Hil. 17 Edw. 3, STATHAM,
supra note 72, Replegiare pl. 6, fol. 161a (1343); Hil. 39 Edw. 3, pl. [24], fol. 6 (1365);
Mich. 13 Hen. 4, pl. 1, fol. 26 (1411); Trin. 15 Hen. 6, STATHAM, supra note 72,
Executours pl. 15, fol. 87b (1437); Mich. 21 Hen. 6, pl. 1, fol. 1 (1442); Mich. 28 Hen.
6, p1. 19, fol. 4 (1449); Trin. 2 Edw. 4, pl. 1, fol. 13, 14 (1462); Pasch. 10 Edw. 4, pl.
1, fol. 1 (1470). Property in testator. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 3, 42 Selden Society 173 (1310-11);
Mich. 17 Edw. 3, pl. 78, R.S. 355, 357 (1343); Mich. 24 Edw. 3, p1. 38, fol. 35 (1350);
Mich. 48 Edw. 3, pl. 8, fol. 20 (1374); Pasch. 3 Hen. 4, pl. 8, fol. 15, 16 (1402); Pasch.
18 Hen. 6, pl. 3, fol. 3, 4 (1439); Trin. 37 Hen. 6, pl. 11, fol. 30 (1459); Pasch. 21 Edw.
4, pl. 2, fol. 21, 22 (1481); Trin. 20 Hen. 7, pl. 2, Keilway 61, 63, 72 Eng. Rep. 223

(1505). Cf Pasch. 10 Edw. 4, pl. 1, 47 Selden Society 1, 3 (1470) (testator was no longer
in being); Hales v. Petit, I Plowden 253, 259, 75 Eng. Rep. 396 (1562) (dead men could
have no property).
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trained" by a defendant who claimed to be owed services or rent by
the plaintiff. When the plaintiff brought the action, the sheriff returned
the animals to the plaintiff and the parties could then proceed to determine if services or rent payments were due." 0 An answer the defendant might make at the outset to stop the sheriff from returning the
claimed animal was that the plaintiff did not have "property" in the
animal in question.
Several sorts of property arguments could work here. The defendant
could claim that he or she had the property in the animal, or that some
third party had the property, or that the plaintiff and a third party both
had the property in common, or that some but not all of a group of coplaintiffs had the property, or that the co-plaintiffs had separate and not
common property in a group of animals taken."' The plaintiff who did
not concede at once could pursue the matter, but a new writ was necessary.
It seems that property, like the right to land, should not be tried without
a writ." 2 By the time of Edward Coke, this was a rule of law." 3 The writ
of proprietate probanda ordered the sheriff to convene a jury of twelve
who would hear the evidence of the parties and determine who had the
110. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 576-78. Paul Brand has gathered
transcripts of plea rols and manuscript reports from the 1270s onward in replevin cases
where property in the chattels came into issue. I thank Dr. Brand for providing me
with copies of these sources.
111. To defendant: 21 Edw. 1, R.S. 107 (1293); Hil. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 55 (1304); 2 Edw.
2, pl. 16A, 17 Selden Society 65 (1308-09); Mich. 31 Edw. 3, STATHAM, supra note 72,
Gager de Deliverans p1. 6, fol. 107a (1357); 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN,
supra note 65, at 142 (1533). To third party: Trin. 33 Edw. 3, STATHAM, supra note 72,
Replegiare pl. 5, fol. 161a (1359); Hil. 6 Hen. 4, pl. 17, fol. 2 (1405); Trin. 2 Hen. 6,
pl. 10, fol. 14 (1424); Mich. 9 Hen. 6, pl. 14, fol. 39 (1430); Hil. 19 Hen. 6, STATHAM,
supra note 72, Barre p1. 75, fol. 35b (1441); Hil. 20 Hen. 6, pl. 6, fol. 18 (1442); Trin.
5 Edw. 4, pl. 19, fol. 5 (1465); 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 65,
at 81 (1527); but see Mich. 21 Edw. 4, p1. 24, fol. 54 (1481) (plaintiff in replevin need
not have property). To plaintiff and third party: Trin. 33 Edw. 3, STATHAM, supra note
72, Replegiare pl. 5, fol. 161a (1359). To fewer than all co-plaintiffs: 2 Edw. 2, p. 62,
17 Selden Society 128 (1308-09); 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note
65, at 202 (1522); Constable, supra note 83, at 229 (1489). To co-plaintiffs severally and
not in common: Pasch. 11 Hen. 6, pl. 17, fol. 31 (1433); Pasch. 34 Hen. 6, pl. 8, fol.
37 (1456); Pasch. 10 Edw. 4, p1. 8, 47 Selden Society 36 (1470); Mich. 12 Hen. 7, pl.
3, fol. 4, 5 (1496); 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 65, at 202 (1522).
112. Mich. 30 Edw. 3, p1. [40], fol. 22 (1356). Paul Brand has found plea rolls and
manuscript reports of writs of proprietateprobanda from 1290 onward. I thank Dr.
Brand for providing me with copies of these sources.
113.

EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OR, A COMMENTARY UPON

1628); On the original logic of the proposition that no one
need answer for his or her freehold except by the king's writ, see S.EC. MILSOM, THE
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM (1976).
LITTLETON 145b (London
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property in the animals. A defendant who falsely claimed property in
the animals not only saw them returned to the plaintiff, but paid a fine
to the king and damages to the plaintiff for the taking.
By the 1470s, when lawyers were compiling the earliest alphabetical
"abridgements" of the Year Books, the cases on "claiming property"
in replevin formed a recognized category under the title Proprietate
probanda. '4 Even so, the writ of proprietate probanda seemed to be
one that the lawyers did not encounter very often. Several Year Book
cases explained the writ's operation in very basic terms, as did later
legal sources." 5 What is most notable about the general run of replevin
cases is the lawyers' apparent lack of interest in how the sheriff and
jury would go about determining who had the property in the animals.'16
Some parties' assertions of property might have been groundless, like
that of the hypothetical plaintiff put forward by Justice Fortescue in
1452, who sought to "buy" a horse from an unwilling seller by bringing
a replevin action for it, getting the sheriff to deliver it, and then paying
damages in trespass." 7 One can imagine many other instances, however,
in which the parties honestly disputed the "property" of an animal,
and the jury had to find it out as well as they could.
Absolute and Relative Property
Lawyers' use of "property" terminology increased steadily in the late
fifteenth-century Year Books. Pleadings grew more complex, and the
Year Book lawyers found themselves more and more often concerned
.114. STATHAM, supra note 72; FITZHERBERT, supra note 39; Lincoln's Inn MS Hale
181, fol. 236r. A later work, ROBERT BROOKE, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT (London
1573) had an alphabetical entry for "Propertie:' No finding aid or index in any early
or modem edition of Year Book material identified the whole range of "property" uses.
Most indices omitted the term altogether.
115. Mich. 30 Edw. 3, p1. 64, fol. 30 (1356); Mich. 7 Hen. 4, pl. 5, fol. 27, 28 (1405);
Trin. 7 Hen. 4, pl. 3, fol. 47 (1406); Hil. 14 Hen. 4, pl. 32, fol. 24 (1413); Mich. 31
Hen. 6, in STATHAM, supra note 72, Proprietate Probanda pl. 5, fol. 138a (1452); Hil
31 Hen. 6, pl. 1, fol. 12 (1453); Mich. 39 Hen. 6, pl. 47, fol. 35 (1460); Mich. 21 Edw.
4, pl. 35, fol. 64 (1481); Constable, supra note 83, at 228-232 (1489); 1 THE REPORTS
OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 65, at 189, 204 (n.d); COKE, supra note 113, at 145b.
One reporter reproduced the writ, Mich. 1 Edw. 4, pl. 18, fol. 9 (1461); and another
noted that the writ was read aloud in court, but that he did not hear it, Mich. 11 Hen.
4, pl. 10, fol. 4 (1409).
116. The determination of property in the country was not a matter of record, and
plaintiffs tried occasionally to relitigate the issue. Mich. 30 Edw. 3, pl. [40], fol. 22
(1356).
117. Mich. 31 Hen. 6, STATHAM, supra note 72, Proprietate Probanda pl. 5, fol. 138a
(1452); 3 FITZHERBERT, supra note 39, Proprietate Probanda pl. 4 [5], fol. 26v (1452).
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to find out which of the persons involved in a complex web of bailments,
rentals, gifts, deaths, devises, and trespasses had the "property" in goods
at a particular time. This "property" took on a more and more absolute
cast. In 1483, for example, one lawyer tried to force the opposing party
to plead specifically where a third party had had property in a chest.
The plea was rejected by the court on the argument that if one had
property in a thing in some certain place, one had it everywhere in the
world-one could not have property in a certain place, but had to have
it in every place." 8
Underlying the whole course of the common lawyers' arguments
about property in the Year Books were assumptions that the "property"
of goods had to belong to someone, and would ordinarily belong to
only one individual at any given time." 9 All goods in the kingdom in
which no one had property were adjudged to the king by his prerogative,
according to Chief Justice Gascoigne in 1406.120 In the exceptional
circumstance, two or more individuals might have property "in common," but only if they shared in acquiring the goods or animals by a
joint purchase or gift. 2 ' Two persons' occupying different roles in a
transaction would not both have the same "property."' 22 The ascription
of "property" carried with it a great many consequences, not least the
pleading advantages summed up in the catch-phrase "he who has the
23
property has the action."'
The lawyers' general acceptance of "absolute" property did not preclude them from finding instances of "relative" property. In one of the
rare cases of replevin in which the lawyers went one step beyond the
blank claim and blank finding of property, the defendant who had taken
some animals was able to prove in 1409 that the property belonged to
a third party at the time of the taking, but the plaintiff seeking replevin
was able to prove that this same third party had leased the animals to
the plaintiff. The Chief Justice concluded that "as against" the defen118. Trin. I Edw. 5, pl. 5, fol. 3 (1483).
119. See, e.g., Pasch. 20 Edw. 4, pl. 1, 47 Selden Society 1, 3 (1470) (Littleton J.)
120. Mich. 8 Hen. 4, pl. 2, fols. 1, 2 (K.B. 1406).
121. See, e.g., Hil. 12 Hen. 4, pl. 19, fol. 18 (1411) (bailment by one of two owners);
Trin. 3 Hen. 6, p1. 10, fol. 49 (1425) (arguing that if two had property in common, one
could pass that property to a purchaser); Mich. 2 Ric. 3, pl. 42, fol. 15, 16 (1484);
Argument in the Inner Temple, Moot Case 47, 105 Selden Society 161 (c. 1490s). Goods
held "in common" were not available for strangers to use and possess. See infra note
175.
122. See, e.g., Hil. 9 Hen. 6, pl. 17, fol. 64 (C.E 1431) (Paston, J., posing a dilemma).
123. Hil. 3 Hen. 7, p1. 16, fol. 4 (1488). Cf Hil. 19 Edw. 3, pl. 34, R.S. 507 (1345);
Constable, supra note 83, at 227 (1489).

62

Law and History Review

dant, the plaintiff as lessee had property in the animals.124 In 1489, a
lawyer explained in one of the formal learning exercises at Lincoln's
Inn that the lessee of domestic animals had property "for a term" while
25
the lessor had the "whole" or "entire property"
More instances of "relative" property followed in the first decade of
the sixteenth century. Lawyers found that one who held animals under
a lease had "good property for a time"' '26 as did one who held goods
as a pledge.' 27 One who held goods as bailee for their safekeeping had
a "special property," property "against all strangers" but not against the
bailor. 28 These references to "special property" or "property for a time"
held by lessees and bailees demonstrated the growing influence of notions of an absolute and unitary "whole property" against all the world,
held by the original possessors of goods and animals.'29
New Propertyfor Old Problems
The Year Book lawyers had long debated whether one who wrongfully
occupied another's land for long enough to plant, raise, and harvest an
agricultural crop could then keep the harvested grain. Another longstanding question was whether those who hunted wild animals on the
lands of others were entitled to the killed or captured animals, as against
the claims of the landholders. After 1450, lawyers began to use the
language of "property' to address these and similar topics. Their disputes led them to speculate how "property" could first be acquired in
things that had not previously existed and in animals that had not
previously belonged to anyone. For arguments on these subjects, the
common lawyers drew upon Roman law and theological debates on
the origins of property.'30
Property in Crops. The Year Book lawyers agreed that standing crops,
like standing trees, were part of the land; only when severed from the
124. Mich. 11 Hen. 4, pl. 39, fol. 17 (1409) (Thirning C.J.). Cf Mich. 1 Edw. 4, pl.
18, fol. 9 (1461) (defendant was lessor).
125. Constable, supra note 83, at 231 (1489).
126. Hil. 21 Hen. 7, pl. 23, fol. 14, 15 (1506).
127. Mich. 20 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 1 (1504).
128. Hil. 21 Hen. 7, pl. 23, fol. 14, 15 (1506); Mich. 21 Hen. 7, p1. 7, Keilway 71,
72 Eng. Rep. 231 (1506).
129. I use "absolute" here in the modem sense, rather than its weaker sixteenthcentury sense. See S.B. Chrimes, The ConstitutionalIdeas of Dr John Cowell, 64 ENG.
HIST. REv. 461, 481 n.1 (1949).
130. For a full discussion extending to manuscript sources, see Baker, supra note 65,
at 210-15.
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land could they be "property " 'a They disagreed whether the property
went to the landholder or to the person who severed the timber or grew
and harvested grain from the land.' 32 In 1456, One lawyer argued that
after timber was cut, it became the property of the taker, because when
no longer annexed to the freehold land the "nature" of the wood was
altered. 3 3 In 1458, another lawyer contended that seeds, when put in
the land, became the property of the person whose soil it was, and when
harvested remained the property of the landholder. 3 4 By the 1470s, a
new generation of common lawyers discovered a distinction between
the two situations. Trees and hay grew on the land by "act of God"
and would be there whether a wrongful occupier held it or not, so they
should go to the rightful possessor of the land. On the other hand, crops
that were sown by the wrongful occupier would not have come into
this act of human labor, so they should go to the wrongful
being but for
35
occupier.
Later common lawyers continued to elaborate these points, stressing
that while both harvested grain and cut timber changed their nature
and became "property" for the first time by the acts of the wrongful
occupier, the occupier would only have "property" in crops grown by
the occupier's own "manual labor. '36 In 1490, some tried to analogize
from this situation to a question that would have been familiar to every
student of Roman law: who should prevail when one person had made
shoes from another person's leather. English common lawyers had probably not conceived of this puzzle as a "property" issue since the time
of Bracton. 37 The lawyers argued in 1490, with appropriate citation to
Bracton's treatise, that the property was altered if the nature of the
thing itself was altered or mixed with another thing, as when grain was
131. Mich. 37 Hen. 6, pl. 12, fol. 6 (1458). Thus it was argued that those with "rights
of common" to graze animals on land had no "property" in the grass. I THE REPORTS
OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 65, at 91 (1522).
132. In an early case, one who leased a field from a life tenant could reap the grain
he sowed after the life tenant's death. Hil. 19 Edw. 3, pl. 23, R.S. 465, 467 (1345). But
one who bought trees from the holder of a limited interest in land acquired "property"
in the timber "conditionally" and had to cut them down before the landholder's interest
ended. Hil. 18 Edw. 4, pl. 1, fol. 21, 1 (1479).
133. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, pl. 3, fol. 2 (1456).
134. Mich. 37 Hen. 6, pl. 20, fol. 10 (1458).
135. Pasch. 12 Edw. 4, pl. 10, fol. 4, 5 (1472); Trin. 15 Edw. 4, pl. 11, fol. 31 (1475).
136. Mich. 2 Hen. 7, pl. 4, fol. 1, 2 (1486); 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN,
supra note 65, at 215 (1534).
137. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 25, at 45-47 (fols. 9b-10b).
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made into malt, or silver melted with gold, or trees cut down and made
into a house, or, as in this case, leather mixed with thread.'38
Propertyin Wild Animals. The introduction of "property" terminology
in cases of capturing or killing wild animals can be traced back to the
1420s, when lawyers stated that a landholder had property in wild
animals only for the time they remained on his or her land. 39 By 1444,
common lawyers had begun to take a position that was repeated in
many cases throughout the 1490s and into the 1520s: no one could
have property in wild animals, but landholders might have something
less, an "interest" in the beasts, that permitted them to grant rights to
hunt and to hold bailiffs to account for depredations. 41 Many invoked
the Roman tag that ferae naturae were nullius in bonis or nullius in
rebus, sometimes citing Bracton's treatise."'4 Common lawyers probably

recognized the classical source of their terminology in this regard.'4 2
Where Roman jurists and medieval civilians had stressed the element
of "capture" in the acquisition of property, the common lawyers reasoned, however, from the "labor" or "industry" expended in the chase
or the domestication, as they had in other cases.'43
It is in this context that Year Book lawyers began to explain the
origin of human "property" in things of this world. In the course of
legal argument in 1520, for example, a lawyer stated that at the beginning
of the world all animals were obedient to Adam, but when Adam sinned
138. Mich. 6 Hen. 7, pl. 4, fol. 7, 8, 9 (1490). See also Anon., Popham 38, 79 Eng.
Rep. 1157 (K.B. 1594) (you mix your hay with mine, embroider my garment, cast your
gold into my melting pot).
139. Trin. 3 Hen. 6, pl. 34, fol. 55 (1425); Pasch. 7 Hen. 6, pl. 41, fol. 36 (1429).
140. Trin. 22 Hen. 6, pl. 11, fol. 59 (1444); Mich. 18 Edw. 4, pl. 12, fol. 14 (1478);
Mich. 7 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 16 (1491); Mich. 10 Hen. 7, pl. 12, fol. 6, 7 (1494); Trin. 10
Hen. 7, p1 . 28, fol. 30 (1495); Mich. 12 Hen. 7, pl. 5, fol. 25 (1496); Mich. 12 Hen. 7,
pl. 2, Keilway 30, 72 Eng. Rep. 187 (1498); Argument in the Inner Temple, Moot Case
57, 105 Selden Society 168 (c. 1490s); 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra
note 65, at 64 (c. 1511-13); Trin. 12 Hen. 8, pl. 3, fol. 3, 4, 5 (1520); Mich. 12 Hen.
8, pl. 2, fol. 9, 10, 11 (1520); Mich. 14 Hen. 8, pl. 1, fol. 1 (1523). Cf Mich. 49 Hen.
6, pl. 10, 47 Selden Society 124 (1470) (possessor of nests had property in fledgling
sparrowhawks).
141. 2 BRACTON, supra note 25, at 41-42 (fols. 8, 8b). Cf id. at 166-67 (fol. 55b).
142. Note, for example, the classical motif in Mich. 12 Hen. 8, pl. 2, fol. 9, 10, 11
(1520) (bos mortuus non est bos; cervus mortuus non est cervus, homo mortuus non est
homo).
143. On the Roman and civilian doctrine, see Charles Donahue, Jr., Animalia ferae
naturae: Rome, Bologna, Leyden, Oxford and Queen's County, N.Y., in STUDIES IN
ROMAN LAW IN MEMORY OF A. ARTHUR SCHILLER 41-55 (Roger S. Bagnall & William
V. Harris.eds., 1986).
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they had rebelled, and now were in common, so that a person who
took a wild animal or bird, and by industry, labor, and diligence made
it tame by restraining its liberty, acquired property in it.'" Such appeals
to an original and "natural" acquisition of property, a "creation story"
for property, became more frequent after 1550 in the reports of Edmund
Plowden. God committed all worldly things to the order and disposal
of men,' 45 and so while God made men lords of the earth and possessors
of all things in it, just how much of the earth and of the things therein
one man should have, and how much another, God left to be ascertained
and settled by mankind, by laws to be made by them for that purpose.'46

Filling out their creation story, lawyers could be heard to argue that
"ever since property has been among men'"they have been able to
leave it by will.'47 Not all property, however, was equally available for
all persons. God made gold and silver so people could trade, for the
good of the whole nation, and thus the king must have the property
in any gold and silver mines, not the proprietors of the soil.' 48
Property in Land
The lone exception I have found to the linguistic split between "property" in goods and "right" in land in the first two centuries of Year
Book reporting is a King's Bench case of 1405. Chief Justice Gascoigne
was reported to have said that if a writ of trespass were brought for
cutting down the plaintiff's trees, a defendant could "claim property
in the freehold" and thereby get a decision on who should hold the
land.'49 Gascoigne's words also appear, without citation or attribution,
and in slightly altered form as "property in the soil'" in the earliest
printed edition of the Old Natura Brevium, an elementary legal text
much in use in the fifteenth century. 5 ° The nature of the defendant's
plea was irrelevant to Gascoigne's point, which was about review in the
144. Trin. 12 Hen. 8, pl. 3, fol. 4 (1520) (Brooke).
145. Colthirst v. Bejushin, I Plowden 21, 31, 75 Eng. Rep. 50 (1550).
146. Sharington v. Strotton, 1 Plowden 298, 308, 75 Eng. Rep. 469 (1565).
147. Graysbrook v. Fox, 1 Plowden 275, 280, 75 Eng. Rep. 427 (1565).
148. The Case of Mines, I Plowden 310, 315-316, 75 Eng. Rep. 480 (1567).
149. Hil. 6 Hen. 4, pl. 6, fol. 1 (K.B. 1405). The same language is found in the earliest
printed report of this case, Richard Tottel's edition of 1553, 6 Hen. 4, pl. [6], fol. [62r,
62v]. A reference to severall proprietk in land in Mich. 12 Ric. 2, pl. 17, Ames 67, 68
(1388), is a misreading of Lincoln's Inn Hale MS 77, fol. 251, 1. 6 (severall tenaunce).
A genuine, though specialized, usage in Mich. 11 Hen. 4, pl. 12, fol. 5 (1409), described
the right to cross one's own land, by analogy to a right of way across another's land,
as "the property (propriete)that he had in the soil:'
150. OLD NATURA BREVIUM fol. 20v (London c. 1518).
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King's Bench of actions commenced with and without writ. "Claiming
property" was the common terminology in actions for replevin of, or
trespass to, goods; "property" was the appropriate term for leases of
land for terms of years. Gascoigne's stray remark shows that there were
contexts in which an English lawyer could think and speak of "property"
in freehold land, particularly in the King's Bench, where relatively few
actions about landholding were heard. In occasional cases before and
after, lawyers used analogies from sales of land to make arguments
about "property" in sales of goods, in contexts that came very close to
acknowledging something called "property" in land. 5 '
"Property of land" reappeared in an action for replevin in 1493, and
the phrase is found again in a report of James Dyer in 1549 on the
king's right to a debtor's goods and land.'52 "Owners" of land appear
in statutes dating from 1491, and in case reports from 1502.13 The

language of statutes changed along with that of the lawyers' case reports.
The preamble of an important Reformation statute in 1532 asserted
that "laws temporal [make] trial of property of land and goods.' 5 4 Only
with Plowden's reports in the later sixteenth century, however, did references to property and jus proprietatisin land, and to "proprietors"
and "owners" of land, begin to appear with any frequency.'55 The
references to "property" in goods and animals still far outnumbered
those to land, and common lawyers probably understood that the term
ordinarily did not encompass land. It was possible to say in 1546, for
example, that in England aliens might "have property," and buy and
56
sell, while clearly meaning that aliens could hold goods but not land.'
When sixteenth-century common lawyers raised their sights from the
151. Mich. 37 Hen. 6, pl. 18, fol. 8 (1458); Pasch. 17 Edw. 4, pl. 2, fol. 1, 2 (1478).
For an early example of analogy to property in a case about land, see Pasch. 17 Edw.
2, fol. 543 (1324).
152. Hil. 8 Hen. 7, pl. 3, fol. 10 (1493); Stringefellow v. Brownesoppe, 1 Dyer 67b,
73 Eng. Rep. 143 (1549).
153. 7 Hen. 7, ch. 2, sec. 5 (1491); 11 Hen. 7, ch. 17 (1494); Mich. 18 Hen. 7, pl. 2,
Keilway 46, 72 Eng. Rep. 204 (1502). See also 1 Hen. 8, ch. 5, sec. 4 (1509) (owner or
proprietary); 21 Hen. 8, ch. 11 (1530) (owners and occupiers of ground); 32 Hen. 8, ch.
7, sec. 1 (1540) (owners and proprietaries). For earlier mentions of owners of goods,
see 4 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 390, col. 1 (1432); 6 id. 65, col. 2 (1473); 4 Hen. 7,
ch. 10, sec. 3 (1487).
154. 24 Hen. 8, ch. 12, sec. 1(6) (1532).
155. Sharington v. Strotton, 1 Plowden 298, 308, 75 Eng. Rep. 469 (1565); The Case
of Mines, I Plowden 310, 315-16, 75 Eng. Rep. 480 (1567); Davy v. Pepys, 2 Plowden
438, 440-41, 75 Eng. Rep. 662 (1573); Paramour v. Yardley, 2 Plowden 539, 543, 75
Eng. Rep. 800 (1579).
156. 38 Hen. 8, Brooke's New Cases 13, 73 Eng. Rep. 852 (1546).
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framework of individual cases to the loftier views of their common law
"as a whole" a more general notion of "property" emerged. By joining
land and goods under a single term, the parliamentary drafters of 1532
could say that the king's common law had as its chief purpose the
determination of property in both these important classes of things.
The new language of property, beginning in the legal writings of the
sixteenth century, was pitched at a higher plane of generalization. Lawyers more often referred to property without specifying the particular
object in dispute. By the early seventeenth century, lawyers and political
writers began to say that property was at least as important and fundamental as the common law itself.'57

Property Beyond the Common Law Literature
The justices and serjeants of the king's courts of common law were
a tiny group, numbering just a few dozen at any one time. Their
technical discourse was quite specialized, but they were all speakers of
the English language in constant communication with lay persons about
matters legal and nonlegal. The lawyers understood that their legal
language was a specialized jargon. They may have deliberately tried to
make it so. The usage of English common lawyers is of little help, then,
in fixing the meaning or context of the word "property" shared among
all English speakers at the time. Historical dictionaries, concordances,
and glossaries of pre-seventeenth-century nonlegal texts, on the other
hand, provide some information on the contemporary vernacular use
of the terms "property" and "owner" in England. 8
Before the sixteenth century, laymen writing in English applied the
term "property" very rarely to land, if at all. Anglo-Saxon texts, legal
and nonlegal, had a term for owning (6genung), owner (6gend, 6gendfi'eb), and what was owned (6igen, 6gan).'5 9 This was a single term that
served to translate what Latin authors distinguished as property (proprietas), possession (possessio), and the lordship (dominium) both of
157. See infra text accompanying notes 228-30, 267-69.
158. I started with ANGLO-NORMAN DICTIONARY 560, 561 (William Rothwell ed.,
1977-); MIDDLE ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1399-1408 (Robert E. Lewis ed., 1956-). For

reasons to prefer the study of usage in surviving vernacular texts to usage in Latin
sources, see Gurevich, supra note 62, at 2.
159. JOSEPH BOSWORTH, AN ANGLO-SAXON DICTIONARY 28-29 (T. Northcote Toiler

ed., London 1882-98);

ALISTAIR CAMPBELL, ENLARGED ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

TO AN ANGLO-SAXON DICTIONARY 3 (1972).
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temporal lords and of Our Lord in heaven.' Writers of the AngloSaxon law codes used the terms figend and ftgend-frefi indifferently for
the "lord" of a servant or slave and for the rightful possessor of stolen
goods or animals.'' They used the same terms whether addressing the
responsibilities of the lord/owner for injury done by servants, slaves,
or animals, or describing the right to obtain recovery or compensation
for loss.'

One late (circa 1020s) Anglo-Saxon source, a charter by a

Yorkshire cleric, described ftgenland, land that was adjacent to a lord's
demesne land (inland) and was neither under lease (laen) nor under
service obligation (weorcland).'63 This is the only recorded reference I
could find to "own-land" or "owned-land" in Anglo-Saxon or Old
English.
"Property" is found in Anglo-Norman texts from the early 11 80s and
in Middle English texts from the 1380s. The most common meaning,
from the age of Geoffrey Chaucer and John Gower down to the time
of William Shakespeare, was that of an "attribute" or "characteristic"
of a person, thing, or abstraction.' 64 When "property" had to do with
a person's interest in a thing-the sense in which lawyers applied the
160. E.g., Caedmon, Genesis, 1.2141, in THE

JUNIUS MANUSCRIPT

64 (George Philip

Knapp ed., 1931) (Genesis 14:22); Cynewulf, Crist and Satan, 1. 1198, in CODEX ExONIENSIS: A COLLECTION OF ANGLO-SAXON POETRY 73, 1. 32 (Benjamin Thorpe ed.,
London 1842).

161. E.g., II Canute, ch. 24, sec. 1, in THE

LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM

at 186 (A.J. Robertson ed. & trans., 1925); Hlothhere & Eadric,
chs. 1, 3, in THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 18 (EL. Attenborough ed.,
1963).
EDMUND TO HENRY I,

162. E.g., Hlothhere & Eadric, chs. 1, 3, in LAWS

OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS,

supra note 161, at 18; Ine, ch. 42, sec. 1; ch. 53, in id. at 52-54; III Aethelred, ch. 4,
sec. 1, in id. at 66.
163. MS verso of The York Gospels in the Dean and Chapter Library, York, If. 156b,

157, in

ANGLO-SAXON CHARTERS

166, I1.11, 16, 26 (A.J. Robertson ed., 1939). The

term figenland is not recorded elsewhere. Id. at 415.

164. See, e.g., GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Tale of Melibeus, 1.2364; The Nun's Priest's
Tale, 1. 4142, in CANTERBURY TALES 210, 274 (Walter W. Skeat ed., Oxford 1894);
BOETHIUS, DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE 54, 100, 173-74 (Richard Morris ed.,
London 1886) (Geoffrey Chaucer trans.) (bk. 3, prose 6, 1. 1435; bk. 3, met. 11, 1.2847;
bk. 5, prose 6, 11.5028, 5083); JOHN GOWER, Confessio Amantis, bk. 7, 11.63, 157, 369,
432, 601, 896, 976, 1001, 1159, 1177, 1237, 1492, in 3 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF JOHN
GOWER: THE ENGLISH WORKS 235-66 (G.C. Macaulay ed., 1901); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer Night's Dream, 3:2:368; The Life and Death of King Richard II,
3:2:131; The Second Part of King Henry IV 4:2:99; Hamlet, 2:1:104, 3:2:247; As You
Like It, 3:2:26; Measurefor Measure, 1:1:3; All's Well That Ends Well, 2:3:131; Antony
andCleopatra,1:1:60 [all citations to 1-3 THE COMPLETE OXFORD SHAKESPEARE (1987)].
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context in nonlegal texts is usually religious, and the con-

notation is overwhelmingly negative. Dozens of surviving manuscripts
from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries praised monastic establishments for holding all goods in common and shunning "property" or
condemned them for doing the opposite.I66 To have "property" of goods
(or goods "in proper") was a sin, and monks guilty of this vice were
denounced as "proprietaries" or "owners. " '
What violated the monastic vow of poverty was no more virtuous
for the laity, according to devotional tracts from the mid-fifteenth century onward. 6 As one allegorical verse of the 1420s put it, property
165. A rare mention of "properties" as attributes or characteristics in the Year Books
is Mich. 39 Hen. 6, pl. 18, fol. 15 (K.B. 1460) (the two properties that rejoinders must
have).
166. E.g., RAYMOND DU Puy, THE HOSPITALLERS' RIWLE 5, 1. 141, Anglo-Norman
Texts no. 42 (K.V.Sinclair ed., 1984) (c. 1185); Jack Upland, in CHAUCERIAN AND
OTHER PIECES 196, sec. 41, 11.190, 194 (Walter W. Skeat ed., Oxford 1897) (1402); A
STANZAIC LIFE OF CHRIST 345, 1. 10157, Early English Text Society no. 166 (Frances
A. Foster ed., 1926) (c. 1400); JOHN CAPGRAVE, LIFE OF ST.AUGUSTINE 44, 1. 4, Early
English Text Society no. 140 (J.J. Munro ed., 1910) (c. 1450).
167. THE FRENCH TEXT OF THE ANCRENE RIWLE I1, 11.30-31, Early English Text
Society no. 240 (W.H. Trethewey ed., 1958) (c. 1325); THE BOOK OF VICES AND VIRTUES
33, 11.23, 24, Early English Text Society no. 217 (W. Nelson Francis ed., 1942) (trans.
of Lorens d'Orleans, Somme Le Roi, c. 1375); 6 RANULPH HIGDEN, POLYCHRONICON ... MONACHI CESTRENSIS 345, Rolls Series no. 41 (Joseph Rawson Lumby ed.,
London 1876) (John Trevisa trans., ante 1387); A Pistle of Preier,in DEONISE HID
DIUINITE AND OTHER TREATISES 58, 1. 9, Early English Text Society no. 231 (Phyllis
Hodgson ed., 1955) (c. 1390); The Declaring of Religion, in TWENTY-SIx POLITICAL
AND OTHER POEMS 81, stanza 8, 1. 59, Early English Text Society no. 124 (J. Kail ed.,

1904) (c. 1421); id. at 83, stanza 18, 1. 141; Comment on the Testament of St. Francis,
in THE ENGLISH WORKS OF JOHN WYCLIF 49, Early English Text Society no. 74 (ED.

Matthew ed., London 1880) (c. 1420); OptionalExpansion to Sermon 11, FirstSunday
in Lent, in LOLLARD SERMONS 142, 1.406, Early English Text Society no. 294 (Gloria
Cigman ed., 1989) (c. 1425); NICHOLAS LOVE, THE MIRROUR OF THE BLESSED LYF OF
JESU CHRIST 318 (Lawrence E Powell ed., 1908) (trans. of Bonaventura, Mediationes
Vitae Christi, 1430); Additions to the Rules of St. Saviour and St. Bridget, in THE
HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF SYON MONASTERY 261 (George James Aungier ed.,
London 1840) (c. 1450); LIFE OF ST. CUTHBERT IN ENGLISH VERSE 60, 1. 2054, Surtees
Society no. 87 (James Thomas Fowler ed., Durham 1891) (c. 1450); The boke of the
Craft of Dying, in 2 YORKSHIRE WRITERS: RICHARD ROLLE OF HAMPOLE AND HIS
FOLLOWERS 417 (C. Horstman ed., London 1896) (c. 1500). See also JOHN WYCLIFFE,
TRACTATUS DE APOSTASIA 30, 1. 28, Wyclif Society no. 9 (Michael Henry Dziewicki
ed., London 1889) (1383) (Latin).
168. JAN VAN RUYSBROECK, Treatise of Perfection of the Sons of God, in THE CHASTISING OF GOD'S CHILDREN 238, 1. 7 (Joyce Bazire & Eric Colledge eds., 1957) (c. 1450);
GUILLAUME DE DEGUILEVILLE, THE PILGRIMAGE OF THE LIFE OF MAN 658, 11.24591,
24593, Early English Text Society Extra Series no. 83 (FJ. Furnivall ed., 1901) (John
Lydgate trans., ante 1475); REGINALD PECOCK, THE DONET 52, 1. 8,Early English Text
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was the huge boil, pimple, or hump on the rich man's back that would
prevent him from passing through the eye of the needle into heaven. 69
In contemporary translations, Thomas A Kempis's De Imitatio Christi
enjoined laypersons to stand "without all manner of property.""'7 So
did Desiderius Erasmus's EnchiridionMilitis Christiani,"' while Thomas
More's Utopia made the argument that "this property be exiled and
'
banished?" 72
There were stages: one virtuous person might give up all
claim to worldly riches "in his own property" and yet hold these same
riches "in common" with others; another might renounce all "civil
lordship,' individual or in common, upon "unmoveable riches" only;
another might renounce this "civil lordship" upon "worldly riches
moveable and unmoveable?""I

In a few of these medieval condemnations of property, virtuous "poverty" was the opposite term.' 74 Much more frequently, however, the

opposite of having "property" in goods was sharing goods in "common."
For the religious writers, property in a thing meant selfish individual
appropriation, storing up more than was needful, and refusing to share.
Consistent with this sense of the term, references to "those who have
no property" in these texts do not denote the destitute, but the "monk,
nun, or espoused wife" (here lawyers would agree) and those who "get
their food in laboring"' 7 5 Yet holding goods in "common" did not

mean sharing with everyone.' 76 A good Franciscan could receive things
Society no. 156 (Elsie Vaughan Hitchcock ed., 1921); THOMAS

A KEMPIS, THE EARLIEST

DE IMITATIONE CHRISTI
112, 1.28, Early English Text Society Extra Series no. 63 (John K. Ingram ed., London
1893) (ante 1500).
169. DEGUILEVILLE, supra note 168, at 490, 11.18353-69.
170. KEMPIs, supra note 168, at 112, 1. 28 (sine... omni proprietatein orig.).
171. DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, ENCHIRIDION MILITIS CHRISTIANA: AN ENGLISH VERSION
152, 1. 10, Early English Text Society no. 282 (Anne M. O'Donnell ed., 1981) (English
trans. 1533-34); id. at 158, 1. 31.
172. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA [44] (Raphe Robinson trans., London 1551); THOMAS
MORE, Utopia, in 4 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS MORE 104, 1. 17 (Edward
Surtz & J.H. Hexter eds., 1965) (sublataprorsusproprietatein orig.). Thomas More did
not use the term elsewhere in Utopia, though he recurred several times to the evils of
private ownership.
173. PEcOCK, supra note 168, at 52, 1. 8.
174. DEGUILEVILLE, supra note 168, at 490, 11.18353-64; id. at 658, 11.24593-94;
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF THE FIRST THREE

BOOKS

OF THE

ERASMUS, supra note 171, at 158, 1. 31.

175. 5 CURSOR MUNDI 1556, 1. 28389, Early English Text Society no. 68 (Richard
Morris ed., London 1878) (ante 1400); THE ROMAUNT OFTHE ROSE 86,1.6594 (Frederick
J. Furnivall ed., 1911) (ante 1425).
176. "In the earlier period the word common implied common exclusiveness quite
as much as common enjoyment' TAWNEY, supra note 51, at 238.
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"for the use" and yet not receive them "for property" 7 Thomas Cranmer condemned the "subtle sophistical term, proprium in communi"
by which the monastic houses amassed riches while their members
professed to observe a vow of poverty 7 Literate, sophisticated English
speakers would probably have understood the term "property" against
this contested religious backdrop of monastic virtues and circumventions. These texts serve as a warning that we may not simply rely on
loose etymology to conclude that property was always "proper,"
that
' 79
wealth was always "well," or that goods were always "good."
A few of the medieval English sources mention property in a more
neutral, secular context. Though having property in goods was bad,
taking another's goods as one's own property was worse. 8 Reaping
where another had sown, John Gower wrote, was to "make common
of property." 8 ' The same author wrote that wars began when a rich
king or lord would "ask and claim property in a thing to which he had
no right, but only his great might,"'8 2 and that the Jews, "dispersed in
all lands," lived "without property of place '83 A churchman, Reginald
Pecock, was the only nonlawyer I found describing the relation of
property to law in medieval England. In two works from the 1440s,
Pecock wrote that the virtuous ruler should "make and ordain to be
177. The Testament ofSt. Francis,in I MONUMENTA FRANCISCANA 568, Rolls Series
no. 4 (J.S. Brewer ed., London 1858) (note on The Pouerte ofthe FreersMinor,c. 1525);
see Gregory IX, Quo elongati (1230) in BULLARI FRANCISCANI EPITOME 230a (C. Eubel
ed., 1908) ("We say therefore that [the friars] ought not to have proprietas, either
individual or common, but may have the usus alone of the utensils and books and
moveable goods which they are permitted to have... leaving the dominion of their
settlements and houses to those to whom it is known to pertain:'); Nicholas III, Exiit
qui seminat (1279), in id. at 293a-293b; DECRETAL VI 5.12.3 in 2 CORPUS IURIS
CANONICI COIs. 1109, 1113-14 (Emil Friedberg ed., Leipzig 1879); M.D. LAMBERT,

FRANCISCAN POVERTY 86-89, 141-45 (1961). Cf id. at 50-51 (no mention ofproprietas
or dominium in St. Francis's own writings).
178. THOMAS CRANMER, OfGood Works, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS AND LETTERS
147 (John Edmund Cox ed., Cambridge 1846) (1560 & 1562 editions add "that is to
say, proper in common").
179. For such arguments, see GOTTFRIED DIETZE, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 9-11
(1971); V.G. Kiernan, PrivatePropertyin History, in FAMILY AND INHERITANCE: RURAL
SOCIETY IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1200-1800, at 361, 364-65 (Jack Goody et al. eds., 1976).
180. GOWER, Confessio Amantis, bk. 5, 1. 6098, in 3 COMPLETE WORKS, supra note
164, at 113; THE TALE OF BERYN 101, 1. 3375, Early English Text Society Extra Series
no. 105 (W.A. Clouston ed., 1909) (c. 1460). See also JACOB'S WELL 138, 1. 27, Early

English Text Society no. 115 (Arthur Brandeis ed., 1900) (c. 1450) (the rich sinner should
make restitution to the "owners" of his goods).
181. GOWER, supra note 164, at 194 (bk. 2, 1.2377).
182. Id. at 289 (bk. 3, 1.2326).
183. Id. at 449 (bk. 5, 1. 1727).
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made, with common assent of the people, laws to rule all his liegemen
in contracts and covenants about property of temporal goods and about
translation and the change of them from one person to another," as
well as laws setting punishments for wrongs."' Pecock also wrote that
the people had a duty to pay to their ruler "bodily service and tribute"
by just laws ordained, "unless he [the ruler] have by any just title
property sufficient upon all the land or upon some" to provide for his
needs without taxation.' 85 The first of these passages generalizes quite
aptly the "property" of the Year Book lawyers: an interest in worldly
goods that was the subject of contracts and covenants, always liable to
transfers and takings. The second passage is not part of the discourse
I find in contemporary legal sources. It denotes a king's property, presumably in his own demesne lands and in feudal services upon all or
part of the land in the kingdom.
One more important term must be traced. "Owners" appear to have
been scarcer in surviving medieval English sources than were "property"
and "proprietaries," The early appearances of "owner" that I have found
are ones describing monks guilty of covetousness.' 86 Writing in the
1440s, Reginald Pecock reminded his readers that their "goods" of
nature, grace, world, and state belonged to God as the truest "owner,"
while they themselves were merely "secondary owners or occupiers. " '
Surviving enrollments, petitions, and wills from 1442 onward refer to
"owners " of tenements, ships, and goods in neutral terms.188 In similar
fashion, "proprietaries" appear after 1440 in a neutral setting, no longer
184. REGINALD PECOCK, THE REULE OF CRYSTEN RELIGIOUN 335, Early English Text
Society no. 171 (William Cabell Greet ed., 1927) (c. 1443); PEcOCK, supra note 168, at

75,1. 23 (make laws "in contracts and covenants about property and thereto appurtenant,
[and] in keeping peace"). Pecock's writings about law are discussed extensively in
NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW (1990).
185. PECOCK, supra note 168, at 78, 1.22.
186. DAN MICHEL, AYENBITE OF INWYT, OR REMORSE OF CONSCIENCE 37, Early

English Text Society no. 23 (Richard Morris ed., London 1866) (1340); 6 HIGDEN, supra
note 167, at 345.
187. PECOCK, supra note 184, at 293.
188. York Enrolment Book B.Y. 87, entry for Jan. 3, 1442, in A VOLUME OF ENGLISH
MISCELLANIES 18, Surtees Society no. 85 (James Raine, Jr. ed., Durham 1890); Petition
of Newcastle Merchants, December 15, 1451, from Public Record Office, Misc. Roll
468, in 3 ARCHAEOLOGIA AELIANA (n.s) 183, 186 (1860); Will of John Baret of Bury,

1463, in WILLS

AND INVENTORIES FROM THE REGISTERS OF THE COMMISSARY OF BURY

ST. EDMUND'S 22, Camden Society no. 49 (Samuel Tymms ed., London 1850); JOHN
CAPGRAVE, THE CHRONICLE OF ENGLAND 170, Rolls Series no. 1 (Francis Charles
Hingeston ed., London 1858) (ante 1464).
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the sinning monks they once were." 9 The dictionary-makers have not
traced the word "ownership" earlier than the sixteenth century, though
one fifteenth-century writer came up with "proprietariness "' 90
In both religious and secular contexts, the term "property" usually
appeared in the abstract, applying to no specific item but to "goods"
in general or to anything at all. "Owners" specifically of land can be
found after 1440, but "property" related to undifferentiated "goods"
or money, and neither to animals nor to the possession of land. The
things that monks and nuns could secretly and sinfully possess were
not landed estates, but clothing, jewels, rich foods, and money. Nonlegal
usage in the Middle Ages establishes that "property" connoted what
was appropriated to an individual person beyond that person's immediate needs, in strong and frequent contrast with what was common
to others. Nonlegal and legal discourses appear to have been at cross
purposes. The standard devotional manuals of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries enjoined all to live (and live well) without property in
goods, while the lawyers supposed that all goods were at all times the
property of some individual person or other. Nothing in the lawyers'
usage of the term hints at the heavy condemnations heaped on property
by the religious writers. In this respect, the usage of clerics and lay
religious figures appears to have had a stronger influence on secular
English texts of nonlawyers than lawyers' usage had.

Christopher St. German and John Fortescue
In the early sixteenth century, the Year Books remained the principal
source and storehouse of the common lawyers' accumulated learning.
Students of the common law could draw much learning about "property" from the disorderly heaps of Year Book manuscripts, but it was
not easy. By this time, however, the common lawyers were introducing
new forms of legal literature in which they devoted more of their attention to problems they saw affecting the common law as a whole:
189. THE ENGLISH REGISTER OF OSENEY ABBEY 161,1. 21, Early English Text Society
no. 133 (Andrew Clark ed., 1907); id. at 162, 11.2, 29 (entries for January 27, 1443).
Agreement dated 1509 from Bishop John Longland's Register of Memoranda at Lincoln,
leaf 240, in LINCOLN DIOCESE DOCUMENTS 132, 1. 1, Early English Text Society no. 149
(Andrew Clark ed., 1914).
190. VAN RUYSBROECK, supra note 168, at 242, 1. 15; id. at 243, 11.22, 24. See 2
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 153 n.1.
191. Neither abridgements, indexes, nor marginal notes would direct readers to every
case discussing property in the Year Books.
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problems of defining the common law, of setting it apart from other
bodies of law, of describing the legitimate sources of the common law,
of explaining the foundations of its authority, of articulating the general
principles that underlay its specific applications, and of discerning an
orderly classification of the subject matter of law. 92 In one of the earliest
and most popular of these new works, readers could glimpse an extensive, abstract, universal "law of property" that was embodied, so the
author said, in English common law.
In the late 1520s, Christopher St. German was in his sixties, no longer
actively practicing as a common lawyer but active in the religious
controversies at the court of Henry VIII.' 93 That is when he wrote
Doctor and Student, two dialogues between a doctor of divinity and a
student of the common law. He intended this work to be his contribution
to a genre of religious writing popular on the Continent: books on how
to resolve conflicts between conscience and law.' 94 St. German's originality lay in his use of English common law rather than civil law for
his examples of conflicts with the commands of conscience. He also
intended the work, it seems, to acquaint clerics, especially ecclesiastical
court judges, with the rudiments of the law of England. 195
To carry out his intentions, St. German had to explain a good deal
of English common law, and he did so in English, expressly to reach
those not already learned in the law. 96 Students at the Inns of Chancery
and Inns of Court soon seized upon his dialogues as an easy route to
legal knowledge. Doctor and Student was said to be more popular than
Thomas Littleton's Tenures in the sixteenth century.' 97
192. On this increase in "self-conscious" writing about the common law, see, e.g.,
WS. Holdsworth, The Reception of Roman Law in the Sixteenth Century, 27 LAW Q.
REV. 236, 239 (1912); Peter Stein, Continental Influences on English Legal Thought,
1600-1900, in LA FORMAZIONE STORICA DEL DIRITTO MODERNO IN EUROPA 1105, 1107

(1977); Wilfrid R. Prest, The Art of Law and the Law of God: Sir Henry Finch (15581625), in

PURITANS AND REVOLUTIONARIES:

TORY PRESENTED TO CHRISTOPHER

ESSAYS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY

HIs-

HILL 94, 115-16 (1978).

193. J.L. Barton, Introduction to ST. GERMAN'S DOCTOR AND STUDENT, 91 Selden
Society xiv (T.ET. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974); J.A. GuY, CHRISTOPHER ST.
GERMAN ON CHANCERY AND STATUTE 3 (1985).
194. Barton, supra note 193, at xx; Donald R. Kelley, The Conscience of the King's
'Good Servant: 52 THOUGHT 293, 294 (1977). St. German refers to these works in the
Second Dialogue, 91 Selden Society 236-37.
195. First Dialogue, 91 Selden Society 130-31; Second Dialogue, id. at 236.
196. Barton, supranote 193, at xxi. St. German composed the First Dialogue in Latin
and the Second in English. The First Dialogue was published in an English translation,
somewhat shortened, soon after the Second Dialogue appeared in that form. Id. at lxixlxxvi. See Second Dialogue, 91 Selden Society 177.
197. Samuel E. Thorne, St. Germain's Doctor and Student, 10 LIBRARY 421, 421
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In the early pages of St. German's work, his doctor of divinity explained how English common law fit into the grand scheme of things,
the descending scale of universally binding legal orders: law eternal, law
of reason (or law of nature), law of God (or revelation), and law of
man (or positive law).' 98 To all this, St. German's student of the laws
of England responded that those "learned in the law," presumably common lawyers like himself, split the law of reason into three parts. In
the first place, the "law of reason primary" by its own force forbade
murder, perjury, deceit, and breaches of the peace. Second, the "law of
reason secondary general" applied reason to human customs that were
not mandated by God or reason but were nevertheless observed by all
nations. By this law, one could begin with the "general law or general
custom of property" and deduce through innate reason that disseisins,
trespasses on land, and theft of goods were unlawful. Third, according
to the student of law, was the "law of reason secondary particular." By
that law, reason operated on the particular laws or customs observed
by one realm alone, England in this case, to reach deductions about
what could and could not be done.'99
Both the doctor's and the student's classifications placed English
common law within the broader realms of law named and described
in the opening sentences of Justinian's Institutes, Gratian's Decretum,
and Bracton's treatise. 00 Students of common law had no doubt heard
of divine law and natural law, and perhaps of the law of nations, in
sermons and religious tracts. 20 ' These were familiar terms of analysis
and debate in England, as they were on the Continent, but they were
ordinarily the tools of theologians and canonists, not of the lawyers at
Westminster Hall. 2 As St. German's student said, "It is not used among
E. PRALL, THE AGITATION FOR LAW REFORM DURING THE PURITAN
1640-1660, at 5 (1966). Enid Campbell has doubted the impact of St.
German's generalizations. Enid Campbell, Thomas Hobbes and the Common Law, 1
TASMANIAN U. L. REV. 20, 43 (1958).
198. GuY, supra note 193, at 19; 91 Selden Society 8-11.
199. 91 Selden Society 32-35.
200. J. INST. 1.2.1; D.1 cc. 1-2, 6-9; 2 BRACTON, supra note 25, at 26-27 (fols. 3b(1930);

STUART

REVOLUTION,

4).
201. See, e.g., PHILIPP MELANCHTHON, LOCI COMMUNES 111-18, 130-31 (1st ed.,
1521, Charles Leander Hill trans., 1944); 1 RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF EcCLESIASTICAL POLITY 58-69, 86-110, 119-24, 130-42 (1st ed., London 1593) (Georges
Edelen ed., 1977) (bk. 1, chs. 2-3, 8-10, 12-13, 15-16).
202. A scattering of references by common lawyers to divine and natural law can be
found in Mich. 13 Edw. 3, pl. 51, R.S. 83, 97 (1339); Pasch. 34 Hen. 4, pl. 9, fol. 38
(1456); Mich. 8 Edw. 4, pl. 9, fol. 12 (1468); Pasch. 12 Edw. 4, pl. 22, fol. 8, 9 (1472);
Hil. 1 Hen. 7, pl. 3, fol. 6 (1486); Mich. I1Hen. 7, pl. 35, fol. 11, 12 (1495); Mich. 20
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them that be learned in the laws of England to reason what thing is
commanded or prohibited by the law of nature and what not' °3 Doctor
and Student brought some longstanding debates out of the theology
schools, into direct contact with common law principles, and, more
important, down to the level of elementary common law instruction.
In particular, St. German introduced generations of beginning law
students to an abstract and universal "law of property" (lex proprietatis)-its origin, nature, and legitimacy. According to Doctor and Student, at the creation of the world and of humankind, all things were
held in common; private property was not necessary." 4 But after the
Fall, as both population and covetousness increased, the first kings
introduced a law of property.2"5 Thus, individual property ownership
was founded on human law and public expediency, consonant with
innate reason and divine revelation but not required by either.0 6 Once
people had property, human law next instituted contracts so that things
could be exchanged. 0 7 St. German repeated over and over again this
"creation story" of property: the early innocent age when all things
were shared in common, the later introduction of private property as
a human invention justified by its utility, and the consequent introduction of laws of contract, another contingent human creation, to
facilitate the exchange of property. 08
All this was traditional theological teaching. 0 9 There was nothing
unjust about individual property, according to the conventional view,
but natural law had originally left all things common to all people.1 0
Human law by custom or statute dictated, as it must in our present
Hen. 7, pl. 21, fol. 11 (1504); Trin. 12 Hen. 8, pl. 2, fol. 2 (1520); Trin. 7 Hen. 8, pl.
5, Keilway 180, 185, 75 Eng. Rep. 362 (1515).

203.
204.
205.
206.

91
91
91
91

Selden
Selden
Selden
Selden

Society 30-31 (not in Latin editions).
Society 18-19 (Latin editions only).
Society 18-19 (Latin editions only).
Society 28-29, 56-57.

207. 91 Selden Society 132-35.

208. 91 Selden Society 38-39, 183, 228. The same account is found in the proemium
to another popular elementary legal text of the time, JOHN PERKINS, A PROFITABLE
BOOK, TREATING OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND XiV (Ist ed., London 1528, 15th ed.,
London 1827).
209. 91 Selden Society xxiv-xxv; THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 2a 2ae, q.

66, art. 2;

TIERNEY,

supra note 105, at 27-33; L.W.B.

BROCKLISs, FRENCH HIGHER
A CULTURAL HISTORY

EDUCATION IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES:

303-4 (1987); Brian Tierney, Public Expediency and NaturalLaw, in

AUTHORITY AND
POWER: STUDIES ON MEDIEVAL LAW AND GOVERNMENT PRESENTED TO WALTER ULLMANN 167, 176 (Brian Tierney & Peter Linehan eds., 1980).
210. See GRATIAN, Decretum D.8, c. 1, in 1 CORPUS IURIS CANONICI cols. 12-13; 2
CARLYLE & CARLYLE, supra note 13, at 136-42; 5 id. at 14-20.
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fallen state, what belonged to me and what to my neighbor."1 ' The
conclusions to be drawn from this orthodox position varied widely.
Must property be shared in times of necessity? May those in need take
away the property of one who misuses it? May the king, with good
cause, take property from an individual? May the king do so without
good cause? Varying answers for all these questions could be found in
late medieval civilian, canonist, and theological writings. 22 St. German
himself stressed the contingent nature of property law and its origin in
human custom in order to point out how the common law and the
king's prerogative could legitimately limit,
condition, and divest indiz3
vidual property in goods and animals.
St. German's Doctor andStudent was the first work on English common
law in wide circulation (that is, the first since Bracton's treatise) to
delineate a general law of property, one applicable to land as well as
goods."1 4 In the 1520s, common lawyers still very rarely applied the word
"property" to land, and St. German, when writing the student's speeches
about specific common law doctrines, remained reluctant to go beyond
the mention of "possession" of, or "right" to, land." 5 Nevertheless, St.
German spelled out the background assumptions that made land the
prime example for a general law of property: that the law in effect
"enclosed" one person's land from another's though they both occupied
an open field, that it was not lawful for anyone to enter into the freehold
of another without consent or other authority, and that the nature of a
fee simple required that the holder be able to alienate it as he wished. 1 6
He challenged conventional assumptions by asking readers to imagine a
211. See, e.g.,

JOHN COLET,

EpistolaeB. Pauli ad Romanos Expositio, in OPuscuLA

134, 259 (J.H. Lupton ed., London 1876) ("This law of a
corrupter nature is the same as that Law of Nations, resorted to by nations all over
the world; a law which brought in ideas of meum and tuum-of property [proprietas],
that is to say, and deprivation [privatio];ideas clean contrary to a good and unsophisticated nature: for that would have a community in all things") It was elementary
learning among civilians that property originated by the "law of nations" or "law of
QUAEDAM

THEOLOGICA

peoples.' J. INST. 2.1.11.

212. See JOSEPH CANNING, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BALDUS DE UBALDIS 7982 (1987); J.P Canning, Law, Sovereignty and Corporation Theory, 1300-1450, in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 454, 457-59; Janet Coleman, Property andPoverty,
in id. at 607, 617-25, 637-48; 1 LEwis, supra note 44, at 94-97; GIERKE, supra note
43, at 79-81, 178-81 nn.271-280.
213. 91 Selden Society 38-39, 146-47, 183, 291; see 91 Selden Society xxx.
214. E.g., 91 Selden Society 158 (Doctor).

215. 91 Selden Society 4-5 (terrarumpossessione and dominio rerum), 222.
216. 91 Selden Society 62-63, 98-99, 140-41, 253, also 222.
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common law that barred all alienation of land or all wills of goods.2" 7
St. German also used the term "contract" as he used the term "property,"
to characterize a universal, abstract legal entity, not the sum of the Roman
"species" of contracts nor that of their common law equivalents, but the
abstract relation within a unified "law of contract" centered on a single
paradigm, the assent to exchange money for goods.2 8
St. German gave common lawyers an entire superstructure of universal laws in which these abstract notions of "property" and "contract"
could play a part, but he was not the first common lawyer to treat
"property" at such an abstract and universal level. In the early 1460s,
John Fortescue, the former Chief Justice of the King's Bench, composed
work in Latin with the title De Natura Legis Naturae.2' 9 The work
never achieved anything like the popularity of Doctor and Student, and
may have been entirely unknown to common lawyers in the sixteenth
century.220 In it, Fortescue argued the losing cause in the battle between
the Houses of Lancaster and York and ridiculed the notion of a female
monarch. He constructed his case for Henry VI entirely from natural
law, which he linked to divine law and distinguished from such human
22
laws as imperial (or civil) law, the law of nations, and English law. '
Like St. German, Fortescue examined the fundamental and universal
categories of property and contract, but he reached different conclusions.
According to Fortescue, property in things (proprietasrerum) and contract (contractus)arose after original sin changed man's status, but owed
217. 91 Selden Society 134-35, 197.
218. 91 Selden Society 228, 231; cf 91 Selden Society 269, 296; Helmut Coing,
Common Law and CivilLaw in the Development ofEuropeanCivilization-Possibilities
of Comparison, in ENGLISCHE UND KONTINENTALE RECHTSGESCHICHTE: EIN FORSCHUNGSPROJEKT 31, 36 (Helmut Coing & Knut Wolfgang N6rr eds., 1985); J.L. Barton,
Towards a GeneralLaw of Contract,in id. at 45, 45-46 (summarizing a paper by Richard
Helmholz).
219. JOHN FORTESCUE, De Natura Legis Naturae, in THE WORKS OF SIR JOHN
FORTESCUE (Thomas Fortescue, Lord Clermont ed., London 1869). Chrimes dates the
composition of De Natura to 1461-63, in JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM
ANGLIE lxvi, lxxiii (S.B. Chrimes ed. & trans., 1949).
220. The few known MSS. date no later than the early sixteenth century. FORTESCUE,
DE LAUDIBUS, supra note 219, at 214-15; Charles Plummer, notes to JOHN FORTESCUE,
THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 75-76 (Charles Plummer ed., Oxford 1885). It was
first published in 1714.
221. FORTESCUE, De Natura, supra note 219, at 66-68, 106-8, 164. See STEPHAN
KUTTNER, HARMONY FROM DISSONANCE: AN INTERPRETATION OF MEDIEVAL CANON

LAW 46 (1960); CANNING, supra note 212, at 69, 76, 78; Alan Harding, The Reflection
of Thirteenth-Century Legal Growth in Saint Thomas's Writings, in AQUINAS AND
PROBLEMS OF HIS TIME 18, 30 (G. Verbeke & D. VerheIst eds., 1976).
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their origin to the same law of nature that had governed paradise.2
His explanation echoed that of contemporary lawyers in Year Book
reports on wild animals and growing crops, and presaged John Locke's
"labor theory": people first acquired property in things by the "sweat
of the brow" (sudore)under the law of nature.2 3 Property in land and
goods descended to heirs, and contract transferred that property from
seller to buyer, all according to a divinely ordained, perpetual, and
immutable law of nature. 24 No one, not even the king, could transfer
more right to another person than he held himself. 25
Fortescue adopted what was a minority view among canonists and

theologians: that private property antedated government and that natural law imposed limits on the legitimate power of the king to appropriate the property of individuals.226 His writings anticipated the work
of St. German, who brought these longstanding pan-European controversies into the mainstream of common law discourse: controversies
not only about the fundamental nature of property, but also about the
relation between natural law and positive law. Such thinking was still,
in the sixteenth century, more theology than law,227 but common lawyers
from the seventeenth century onward made these debates their own
and shaped them in new ways, with enormous consequences for their
country and the world. One of the necessary tools for this debate, one
provided in part by St. German and Fortescue, was a structure of legal
ideas that could juxtapose the common law with divine, natural, and
222. FoRTEsCuE, De Natura,supra note 219, at 82, 149-50 (property in immoveable
and praedial things, movable and personal things); id. at 168. See Winifred Gleeson
Keaney, Sir John Fortescue and the Politicsof the Chain of Being, in JACOB'S LADDER
AND THE TREE OF LIFE: CONCEPTS OF HIERARCHY AND THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING

221, 230 (Marion Leathers Kuntz & Paul Grimley Kuntz eds., 1987); Edgar W. Lacy,
The Relation of Property and Dominion to the Law of Nature, 24 SPECULUM 407, 4079 (1949); SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 72-75 (1951).
223. FORTESCUE, De Natura,supra note 219, at 82 (invoking God's words to Adam,
Genesis 3:19, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat [thy] bread."). See SCHLATrER,
supra note 222, at 73. John Locke's version is set forth in chapter 2, section 6 of his
Second Treatise of Government. LOCKE, supra note 14, at 271.
224. FORTESCUE, De Natura, supra note 219, at 91, 102, 106-8, 145. But kings could
take land away from one person to give to another, id. at 83-84.
225. Id. at 125, 147; cf FORTESCUE, De titulo Edwardi Comitis Marchiae,in WORKS
OF SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, supra note 219, at 66*; Defensio JurisDomus Lancastriae,
in id. at 506.
226. DOE, supra note 184, at 26-27; Coleman, supra note 43, at 614-25, 638-40;
Tierney, supra note 209, at 177-82.
227. See, e.g., De Haeresibus, ch. 14, in REFORMATIO LEGUM ECCLESIASTICARUM
(1549); cf The Forty-Two Articles of Religion of 1552, no. 37, and the well-known
Thirty-Nine Articles, no. 38.

Law and History Review

80

rational norms, and could treat abstractions like property and contract
as basic and necessary elements of any complete body of law.
Seventeenth-Century Voices
By the early seventeenth century, "property" had been installed, at
least in elementary works on the common law, as a fundamental concept
applying to land as well as to other things. "The end and effect of the
law," according to a popular tract for law students written in 1599, "is
to settle the property and right of things in them to whom they belong,
and to judge those things common which continuance of time and the
intercourse of parties have distributed and warranted to many."'22 Another work, falsely attributed to Francis Bacon, opened with the words:
"the use of the law consists principally in these three things: 1. To secure
men's persons from death and violence. 2. To dispose the property of
their goods and land. 3. For preservation of their good names from
shame and infamy."229 The real Francis Bacon, in a manuscript presented
to James I, made a "true and received division" of the common law
between ius privatum, "the sinews of property" and ius publicum, the
sinews "of government" 2 3" John Cowell's law dictionary of 1607 supplied an influential definition of property: "the highest right that a man
hath or can have to any thing,' a term that was used "for that right in
lands and tenements, that common persons have," despite Cowell's
" '
royalist objections.23
The legal writings of Edward Coke, extremely influential for generations of common lawyers, are a good indicator of the use of property
language in the early seventeenth century. Coke was Attorney General
in 1600 when he published the first volume of his Reports and Chief
Justice of the King's Bench when he published his eleventh volume in
1615. In Coke's Reports, the word "property" usually appears in the
228. WILLIAM FULBECK, DIRECTION, OR PREPARATIVE TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW
144 (repr. 1987).
229. The Use ofthe Law, fol. 1, publ. with Francis Bacon's maxims in THE ELEMENTS
OF THE COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND (London 1630) (spelling and punctuation modernized). The anonymous author then went on to discuss "property in lands" by entry,
descent, escheat, and conveyance, fols. 26-72, and "property in goods," fols. 72-84. See

also JOHN

DODDERIDGE, THE LAWYERS' LIGHT

16-42, 65-66 (London 1629).

230. FRANCIS BACON, A Preparationtowardthe Union ofLaws (lst ed., London 1641)

in 7 THE
1872).
231.

WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON

COWELL,

731, 733 (James Spedding et al. eds., London

supra note 40, s.v. Propertie, sig. [Ff1 4]-[Fff 4v] (Cambridge 1607).

See supra, text accompanying notes 40, 48.
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context of goods or animals, while the words "owners" and "ownership"
usually appear in the context of lands.232 Coke had recently retired from
his seat in Parliament when he published the first volume of his Institutes, his famous Commentary on Littleton, in 1628. In his Institutes,
Coke made a few more references to "property" in land and many
more to "owners" of goods and animals. The terms were gradually
converging. Coke's most striking use of "property" was his figurative
use of the term at the end of his Commentary on Littleton, where he
advised law students that by knowing the reason of the law they could
acquire "property" and ownership" of law.233
Coke's Reports distinguished those who had the "absolute," "general,"
"whole,' or "very" property in goods from those who merely had a "qualified," "possessory," or "special" property. Most mentions of "property" in
Coke's works follow the familiar patterns of Year Book usage: husbands
and wives, testators and executors, churches, bailments, forfeitures, replevins, sales of stolen goods, wild animals, growing crops, and trees. Coke
repeated a version of the "creation story" of property in his Commentary
on Littleton: "after the Flood, all things were common to all" but "under
the law natural, and by multiplication of people, and making proper and
private those things that were common, arose battles." '
What were new in Coke's legal works were the grand generalizations
that "laws temporal [make] trial of property of land and goods" 5 and
that "in our law there is jus proprietatis[right of property], possessionis
and possibilitas,' '11 6the "rule of law" that one needed a writ to try property,237
the "rule of the common law" that "when no man can claim property in
any goods, the King shall have them by his prerogative," 238 and the "maxim"
that "property of all goods must be in some person. ' 29 "Ownership;'
232. For example, an interest in standing trees, when divided from interest in land,
is "property"; when reunited, it is "ownership." Herlakenden's Case (Ivy v. Herlakenden), 4 Co. Rep. 62a, 62b-63b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1027-1030 (K.B. 1589).
233. COKE, supra note 113, at 394b.
234. Id. at 116b.
235. De Jure Regis Ecclesiastico, 5 Co. Rep. la*, 29b*, 77 Eng. Rep. 34 (quoting 24
Hen. 8, ch. 12, sec. 1[6] [1532]); EDWARD CoKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES
321 (London 1644).
236. Lampet's Case (Lampet v. Starkey), 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 50b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1002
(C.P 1612); see COKE, supra note 113, at 266a, 369a; EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART
OF THE INSTITUTES 110 (London 1643).
237. COKE, supra note 113, at 145b.
238. Constable's Case (Constable v. Gamble), 5 Co. Rep. 106a, 108b, 77 Eng. Rep.
223 (KtB. 1601).
239. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES 167 (London 1642); see
COKE, supra note 236, at I10.
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according to Coke, meant that owners could declare and dispose the use
of land,2" could devise all24' or at least two-thirds242 of their land, could
charge two-thirds of their land,243 could lease and sell,2' and could build
houses for the poor without the king's license,245 but could not exclude

commoners (those with rights of common on the land).2 6

Other case reports from the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
similarly continued the medieval learning about property in goods and
animals, generalized more readily about property, and introduced "owners" of "property" in land. Lawyers stated in several contexts that only
the courts of common law, not the church courts nor the king's courts
of Admiralty or of High Commission, could decide questions of property.247 The bulk of common law cases mentioning "property" did so
in reference to goods or animals. Most of these cases involved questions
of whether and when the property was "altered" from one person to
another in a purchase and sale or other covenant or grant,248 in a judicial
execution, forfeiture, condemnation, or bankruptcy,249 in a conversion,
240. Beckwith's Case (Colgate v. Blyth), 2 Co. Rep. 56b, 57b, 76 Eng. Rep. 546 (C.P.
1589).
241. Butler v. Baker, 3 Co. Rep. 25a, 30b, 33b, 76 Eng. Rep. 695-96, 704 (K.B. 1591).
242. Clere's Case (Parker v. Clere), 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 18a, 77 Eng. Rep. 280 (Assise
1599).
243. Pexhall's Case (Barton v. Moore), 8 Co. Rep. 83b, 85b, 77 Eng. Rep. 604 (C.R
1609).
244. Combe's Case (Atlee v. Banks), 9 Co. Rep. 75a, 76a, 77 Eng. Rep. 844 (C..
1613).
245. The Case of Sutton's Hospital (Baxter v. Sutton), 10 Co. Rep. 23a, 26b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 965 (K.B. 1612).
246. Corbet's Case (Clere v. Corbet), 7 Co. Rep. 5a, 5a, 77 Eng. Rep. 418 (Exch.
1585); Barrington's Case (Chalke v. Peter), 8 Co. Rep. 136b, 136b-138a, 77 Eng. Rep.
682-84 (C.P. 1610).
247. E.g., Goram v. Fowks, 4 Leon. 150, 74 Eng. Rep. 788 (K.B. 1591); Rooper v.
Bulbroke, Noy 149, 74 Eng. Rep. 1111 (KB. c. 1610); Palmer v. Pope, Hobart 79, 80
Eng. Rep. 229 (C.P 1611); R. v. Brown, Carthew 398, 399, 90 Eng. Rep. 831 (K.B.
1692).
248. Hopkins v. Stapers, Cro. Eliz. 229, 78 Eng. Rep. 485 (K-B. 1591); Evans v.
Thomas, Cro. Jac. 172, 173, 79 Eng. Rep. 151 (K.B. 1607); Moore v. Moore, 1 Bulstr.
169, 80 Eng. Rep. 860 (KB. 1611); Havergil v. Hare, 3 Bulstr. 250, 252, 81 Eng. Rep.
212 (K.B. 1616); Hitchcock v. Fox, 1 Rolle 68, 69, 81 Eng. Rep. 333 (K.B. 1614); Mires
v. Solebay, 2 Mod. 242, 243, 244, 86 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1051 (K.B. 1677); Cramlington
v. Evans, I Show. K.B. 4, 5, 89 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.B. 1686); Thompson v. Leach, 2
Ventris 198, 203, 86 Eng. Rep. 394; 1 Show. K.B. 296, 89 Eng. Rep. 586 (C.E 1690);
Knight v. Hopper, Skin. 647, 90 Eng. Rep. 290 (K.B. 1695); Evans v. Martrell, 3 Salk.
290, 291, 91 Eng. Rep. 831, 1 Ld. Raym. 271, 91 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B. 1697).
249. Goodyer v. Junce, Yelv. 179, 180, 80 Eng. Rep. 119 (K.B. 1610); Wilbraham v.
Snow, I Mod. 30, 31, 86 Eng. Rep. 708 (K-B. 1670); Ekins v. Smith, T. Raym. 336, 83
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trespass, theft, piracy, or capture by the enemy,25° in a marriage, 25 1 or
in a cast of dice.252
The common lawyers continued to argue the claims of property in
growing trees and growing crops. 253 With much greater frequency, the
lawyers sorted a whole menagerie of wild animals (ferae naturae) into
the property of the landowner, of the tamer, of the hunter, of the king,
and of no one.254 In these and other contexts, lawyers were puzzling

out the relation between the right to property and the right to possession.

5

One argument gave the owner of land the property in wild

Eng. Rep. 175 (Exch. 1678); Brook v. Smith, 1 Salkeld 280, 91 Eng. Rep. 245 (Nisi
Prius 1693); Martin v. Wilsford, Carthew 323, 325, 90 Eng. Rep. 791 (Exch. 1694); R.
v. Broom, Carthew 398, 399, 90 Eng. Rep. 831 (K.B. 1696); Roberts qui tam v. Wetherhead, Comberbach 361, 90 Eng. Rep. 528; 1 Salkeld 223, 91 Eng. Rep. 198 (K.B.
1696).
250. Rooke v. Denny, 2 Leon. 192, 193, 74 Eng. Rep. 470 (C.P 1586); Anon., Cro.
Eliz. 685, 78 Eng. Rep. 921 (C.P 1599); Gumbleton v. Grafton, Cro. Eliz. 781, 78 Eng.
Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1600); Bishop v. Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824, 78 Eng. Rep. 1051 (C.P.
1600); Brown v. Wootton, Cro. Jac. 73, 74, 79 Eng. Rep. 63 (K.B. 1605); Greenway v.
Baker, Godbolt 193, 78 Eng. Rep. 117 (C.E 1612); Serviento v. Jolliff, Hobart 78, 79,
80 Eng. Rep. 228 (C.E c. 1615); Radly v. Eglesfield, 1 Ventr. 174, 86 Eng. Rep. 118
(K-B. 1671).
251. Hastings v. Douglas, Cro. Car. 343, 344, 345, 79 Eng. Rep. 902, 903 (KB. 1634).
252. West v. Stowell, 2 Leon. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 438 (C.E 1578); Walker v. Walker,
5 Mod. 13, 87 Eng. Rep. 490; Comberbach 303, 90 Eng. Rep. 492; Holt K.B. 328, 90
Eng. Rep. 1081 (K.B. 1694).
253. E.g., Hare v. Okelie, 1 Leon. 315, 74 Eng. Rep. 286 (C.P. 1578); Tisdale v. Essex,
Hobart 34, 35, 80 Eng. Rep. 793 (K.B. 1616); Anon., 1 Leon. 275, 74 Eng. Rep. 25051 (KB. 1584); Lewknor v. Ford, I Leon. 48, 49, 74 Eng. Rep. 45-46; 4 Leon. 162,
163-65, 225, 227-29, 74 Eng. Rep. 796-97, 838-39; Godbolt 114, 116-18, 78 Eng. Rep.
71-72 (C.P. 1586); Anon., Godbolt 98, 99, 78 Eng. Rep. 61 (C.E 1586); Chalk v. Peter,
Godbolt 167, 168, 78 Eng. Rep. 102 (C.E 1610); Heydon v. Smith, Godbolt 172, 173,
78 Eng. Rep. 105-6 (C.E 1610).
254. Dewell v. Sanders, 2 Rolle 30,31, 81 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1618) (salmon, sturgeon,
doves); Vincent v. Lesney, Cro. Car. 18, 19, 79 Eng. Rep. 621 (C.E 1625) (hawk); Child
v. Greenhill, Cro. Car. 553, 554, 79 Eng. Rep. 1077; March N.R. 48, 49, 82 Eng. Rep.
406 (K.B. 1639) (deer, rabbits, doves, fish); Lister v. Hone, March N.R. 12, 82 Eng.
Rep. 389 (K.B. 1639) (hawk); Usher v. Bushnel, T. Raym. 16, 83 Eng. Rep. 9 (KB.
1661) (pheasant); Mallocke v. Eastly, 3 Lev. 227, 83 Eng. Rep. 663 (C.E 1685) (deer);
Polyxphen v. Crispin, 2 Keble 765, 766, 84 Eng. Rep. 484; 1 Ventr. 22, 23; 86 Eng. Rep.
85 (K.B. 1671) (fish, pheasant); Sutton v. Moody, Comberbach 458, 90 Eng. Rep. 590;
2 Salk. 556, 91 Eng. Rep. 471 (KB. 1697) (rabbits).
255. E.g., Foster v. Spooner, Cro. Eliz. 17, 17-18, 78 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.E 1583); Brent's
Case, 2 Leon. 14, 16, 74 Eng. Rep. 320 (C.E 1575); Finch's Case, 2 Leon. 134, 141, 74
Eng. Rep. 426 (Exch. 1591); Hill v. Haukes, 1 Roll. 44, 45, 81 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B.
1614); Bowles v. Berrie, 1 Rolle 177, 180, 81 Eng. Rep. 415 (K.B. 1615); Lister v. Hone,
March N.R. 12, 82 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1639); Polyxphen v. Crispin, 2 Keble 765, 766,
84 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1671); Smith v. Kemp, Carthew 285, 286, 90 Eng. Rep. 769
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animals "by reason of possession" so long as they remained on the soil,
while the response was that the hunter who chased an animal onto the
owner's land had possession and property "by the pursuit "2' 56 Lawyers
were thus equating two very different kinds of possession, one exercised
simply by ownership of land and another by effort or industry.
The lawyers also continued to distinguish kinds or degrees of property.
Most often, they found "general" property in one person (a bailor,
lessor, reversioner, buyer, etc.) and "special" property in another (a
bailee, lessee, termor, seller, etc.).257 "General" property was also "absolute" "principal," "greater," "grand' "whole," "true," or "very" property; the corresponding "special" property was "qualified" "condi258
tional," "present," "possessory" "mere," and "a kind of" property.
"And therefore quaere" asked a pair of common lawyers in 1586, "what
shall be meant by this word 'property'?"2'59 A grand rule was emerging:
whoever had the "general" or "absolute" property in a thing could
assert the interest against everyone in the world, and whoever had the
"special" property could assert it against everyone but the "general" or
26

"absolute" owner.

0

(K.B. 1693); Coombes v. Hundred of Bradley, 4 Mod. 303, 305, 87 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.B.
1694).
256. E.g., Anon., 2 Leon. 201, 74 Eng. Rep. 478 (K.B. 1586); Coney's Case, Godbolt
122, 123, 78 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B. 1587).
257. E.g., Luddington v. Amner, Godbolt 26, 27, 78 Eng. Rep. 17 (K.B. 1583); Wood
v. Ash, Owen 139, 74 Eng. Rep. 958 (C.P 1586); Bloss v. Holman, Owen 53, 74 Eng.
Rep. 893 (C.P. 1587); Bind v. Plain, Cro. Eliz. 218, 219, 78 Eng. Rep. 474, 475; 1 Leon.
220, 221, 74 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1591); Price v. Simpson, Cro. Eliz. 718, 719, 78 Eng.
Rep. 953 (C.P 1599); Heydon v. Smith, Godbolt 172, 173, 78 Eng. Rep. 105 (C.E 1610);
Ratcliffv. Davis, Yelv. 178, 80 Eng. Rep. 118; 1 Bulst. 29, 30, 80 Eng. Rep. 735 (K.B.
1610); Bowles v. Berrie, 1 Rolle 177, 180-82, 81 Eng. Rep. 415-16 (K.B. 1615).
258. E.g., Luddington v. Amner, Goldbolt 26, 27, 78 Eng. Rep. 17 (K.B. 1583); Anon.,
I Leon. 275, 74 Eng. Rep. 250-51 (K.B. 1584); Anon., 2 Leon. 201, 74 Eng. Rep. 477
(K-B. 1586); Lewknor v. Ford, Godbolt 114, 116, 117, 78 Eng. Rep. 71; 1 Leon. 48, 49,
162, 163-64, 225, 227-29, 74 Eng. Rep. 45, 796-97, 838-39 (C.P. 1586); Wood v. Ash,
Godbolt 112, 113, 78 Eng. Rep. 69 (C.E 1586); Coney's Case, Godbolt 122, 123, 78
Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B. 1587); Shelbury v. Scotsford, Yelv. 23, 24, 80 Eng. Rep. 17 (K.B.
1602); Dowglas v. Kendall, 1 Bulstr. 93, 94-95, 80 Eng Rep. 793-94 (K.B. 1610); Dewell
v. Sanders, 2 Rolle 30, 32, 81 Eng. Rep. 640 (K.B. 1618); Hastings v. Douglas, Cro.
Car. 343, 345, 79 Eng. Rep. 903 (K.B. 1634); Lister v. Hone, March N.R. 12, 82 Eng.
Rep. 389 (K.B. 1639); Wilbraham v. Snow, I Lev. 282, 83 Eng. Rep. 408; 1 Mod. 30,
86 Eng. Rep. 708 (K.B. 1670); Sutton v. Moody, Comberbach 458, 90 Eng. Rep. 590;
3 Salk. 290, 91 Eng. Rep. 831; 1 Ld. Raym. 250, 251, 91 Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B. 1697).
259. Lewknor's Case, 4 Leon. 225, 228, 74 Eng. Rep. 838 (C.P. 1586) (Seijeants
Fenner and Walmsley).
260. E.g., Rockwood v. Feasar, Cro. Eliz. 262, 78 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1591); Smith
v. Oxenden, 1 Chan. Cas. 25, 22 Eng. Rep. 676 (Ch. 1663).
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Two or more persons could thus have different sorts or degrees of
property in the same goods or land, but the lawyers' vocabulary did
not have room for more than one sort of "owner." The owner of land
was free to till the ground or stock it with game, and to part with the
land as he pleased, all of it by grant or use, or two-thirds by devise, "if
it be according to law"'26' With the proliferation of references to "owners,'
old debates were phrased in new ways. Confficts were no longer between
holders of rights of common and "the lord of the manor" or "he who
the commoner and the
has the freehold." Now the protagonists were
"owner of the soil" or "owner of the land' 262
Having extended the scope of "property" to one's land, lawyers at
the start of the seventeenth century considered extending it still further,
to one's children. Asking whether an action of trespass lay for taking
a parrot, a thrush, or a spaniel,263 and finding no examples in the Register
of Writs, lawyers made the issue whether the law imputed "property"
in such an animal to the plaintiff. Asking whether a father could sue
in trespass for the abduction of his daughter (not the heir apparent),
and finding nothing in the Register, a majority of Justices in the Court
of Common Pleas held that "[h]ere the father has not any property or
interest in the daughter, which the law accounts may be taken from
him' 264 The justices conceived the possibility of ascribing property in
a child to the parent, but rejected it. A century later, justices on the
same court would affirm that the owner had a property in a villein and
the guardian had a property in a ward, though English law took no
261. Brent's Case, 2 Leon. 14, 16, 74 Eng. Rep. 320 (C.P 1575) ("as clay is in the
hands of the potter"); Inchley v. Robinson, 2 Leon. 41, 42, 74 Eng. Rep. 342 (C.P
1587); Ward v. Lambert, Cro. Eliz. 394, 78 Eng. Rep. 639 (C.P 1593); Soulle v. Gerrard,
Cro. Eliz. 525, 78 Eng. Rep. 773-74 (C.P 1595); Sharpe v. Sharpe, Noy 148, 74 Eng.
Rep. I110 (C.E 1609). Cf R. v. Boreston, Noy 158, 160, 74 Eng. Rep. 1120 (Exch. Ch.

1600) (owner cannot make an heir).
262. Hawks v. Mollineux, I Leon. 73, 74 Eng. Rep. 69 (C.E 1587); Fowler v. Dale,
Cro. Eliz. 362, 363, 78 Eng. Rep. 612 (C.E 1594); Gresham v. Ragge, Owen 114, 74
Eng. Rep. 940 (K.B. 1601); Crosse v. Abbot, Noy 14, 74 Eng. Rep. 985 (K.B. 1605);
Kendridge v. Pargettor, Noy 130, 74 Eng. Rep. 1093 (K.B. 1608). Cf Chalk v. Peter,
Godbolt 167, 168, 78 Eng. Rep. 102 (C.E 1610) (owner of the profits may not be the

same as owner of the soil).
263. On whether one could have property in a dog, see Trin. 12 Hen. 8, p1. 3, fols.
3-5 (1520); Fines v. Spencer, Dyer 306b, 307a, 73 Eng. Rep. 692 (K.B. 1572); Ireland
v. Higgins, Cro. Eliz. 125, 126, 78 Eng. Rep. 383; Hetley 50, 124 Eng. Rep. 334 (K(B.
1588); Chambers v. Workhouse, 3 Salk. 140, 91 Eng. Rep. 739 (C.E 1692).

264. Barham v. Dennis, Cro. Eliz. 770, 78 Eng. Rep. 1001 (C.E 1601). Cf Jenks v.
Holford, 1 Vern. 61, 62, 23 Eng. Rep. 312 (Ch. 1682) (a patent providing that no other

shall use a new invention may vest a property).
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notice of negro slavery within England.265 The lawyers yearned toward
a rule that no one could have property in the person of another, but
could not say it without qualification.266
A new extension of property language is found in a singular argument
of John Vaughan, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, in the
Exchequer Chamber in 1673. The learned Chief Justice Vaughan, at
home in canon, civil, and biblical law,could also speak in the voice of
contemporary political theorists. Explaining the distinction between
malum prohibitum, which the law could permit, and malum in se,
which the law could not permit, Vaughan said that "in life, liberty, and
estate, every man who has not forfeited them, has a property and right
which the law allows him to defend, and if it be violated, [the law]
267
gives an action to redress the wrong, and to punish the wrongdoer.'
His point was that "a law can alter, change, or transfer a man's property
in life, liberty, estate, or any interest [to another man], as it will" and
so "to alter or transfer men's properties to others is no malum in se,
it is daily done by the owner's express consent, and by a law without
their express consent.' 268 But "to violate men's properties is never lawfii"
that was "a malum in se."269 This was a view Thomas Hobbes condemned and John Locke embraced.

Conclusion
Common lawyers before 1490 did not apply the word "property" to
land because land was different. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
land was different not merely because (in theory) one "held" land for
services due to a feudal lord, and not merely because (in theory) land
could not be devised by will, but more important because land was far
265. Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk. 666, 91 Eng. Rep. 566; 2 Ld.Raym. 1275, 92 Eng. Rep.
338; Holt K.B. 495, 90 Eng. Rep. 1173 (K.B. 1706); Smith v. Gould, 2 Salk. 666, 667,
91 Eng. Rep. 567 (K.B. 1705).
266. Butts v. Penny, 2 Lev. 201, 83 Eng. Rep. 518; 3 Keble 785, 84 Eng. Rep. 1011

(K.B. 1677) ("there could be no property in the person of a man sufficient to maintain
trover," "no property could be in a villein but by compact or conquest," "no property
in the plaintiff more than in villeins"); Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk. 666, 91 Eng. Rep. 566;
2 Ld. Raym. 1275, 92 Eng. Rep. 338; Holt K.B. 495, 90 Eng. Rep. 1173 (K.B. 1706)
("By the common law, no man can have a property in another, but in special cases").
267. Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan 330, 337, 124 Eng. Rep. 1102 (Exch. Ch. 1673).
268. Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan 330, 338, 124 Eng. Rep. 1102 (Exch. Ch. 1673).

269. Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan 330, 337-38, 124 Eng. Rep. 1102-03 (Exch. Ch.
1673), citing Mich. IIHen. 7, pl. 35, fol. 11-12 (1495), and 2 BRACrON, supra note
25, at 373 (fol. 132b).
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less vulnerable to interference by others than were goods, animals, or
sums of money. Land could sustain multiple overlapping claims by
many individuals and casual or regular uses by many others. The primary relation of an individual to a parcel of land, what lawyers called
the "right,' could be maintained without physically excluding others.
Indeed, land had little value to the rightful holder if others were entirely
excluded.
While common lawyers lavished their attention on the multiplicity
of estates, tenures, and customary arrangements that could concern an
imperishable and enduringly productive tract of land, the relation to
goods and animals that the lawyers called "property" was simpler.
Ascribing property to one person excluded all relations with other persons except those of safeguarding or leasing, and even these had to be
called "property" of a qualified or special sort. One who had the property
in a thing preserved this bond with the object wherever it was carried
and wherever it strayed. The property relation pointed to the person
who had capacity to bring actions in court and to initiate transactions
out of court. In the practical arrangements of life in late medieval
England, it was goods and animals, not land, that came closest to what
Blackstone would later call "that sole and despotic dominion... in
' '27°
total exclusion of the rights of any other individual in the universe.
After 1490, practitioners of English common law began to assimilate
their terminology for landholding to their terminology for ownership
of goods and animals. There could now be "property" in land and
"owners" of land. One explanation for this shift in legal vocabulary is
a desire for simplification. It was simpler to have one term and one set
of concepts for the relations of people to land, goods, and animals all
together than to continue the bifurcated terminology of the previous
two centuries. Property in goods and animals was a much simpler
concept than right, estate, and tenure in land, so in this sense the simpler
and more abstract concept took over and subordinated the more complex set of landholding interests. By writing about property in land and
ownership of land, lawyers from the sixteenth century onward invoked
a stark mental image of one solitary person alone in complete and
exclusive possession of one tract of land. It became possible now for
lawyers in England to speak and write about "property in general" with
reference at once to land, goods, and animals alike. This was a powerful
generalization, destined for enormous impact on law and government,
but was one that could not have been uttered while the lawyers' language
about goods and language about land remained separate.
270.
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Law and History Review
From the beginning of the seventeenth century onward, we can begin
to speak of a general law of property without doing violence to the
words and conceptions of the lawyers whose doctrines we describe.
From one perspective, this widespread understanding that the common
law protected a fundamental interest called "property" was barely a
century old in 1600. From another perspective, it was an idea about
law rooted in the oldest and most widely used legal texts,, one that had
always been available to common lawyers to accept or reject as they
wished. In many of the results the late-fifteenth-century common lawyers reached using "property" terminology, I find echoes of Roman and
canon law,the common heritage of "sophisticated" law as it was taught
in universities in England and throughout Europe.
English common lawyers, though they did not accept the Roman and
canon texts as "works of authority" or official "sources" of law, never
entirely cut themselves off from the influence of Roman and canonist
ideas, particularly in substantive matters. Common law discourse rapidly re-incorporated much of the basic Roman legal terminology in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, not least this broader and more
abstract notion of "property." The English lawyers' accounts of a "natural" origin of property came straight out of a rich stream of theological
and canonist debates on the moral status of individual property ownership.
I conclude, then, with a question. Abstract conceptions of absolute
and individual property in all "things,' along with accounts of property's
ultimate origin and justification, were available to English common
lawyers throughout the entire period under study. Why did the English
lawyers begin to reintroduce these conceptions and creation stories only
in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries? Why did they start
then to use a unitary, foundational category of "property" to account
for their dealings concerning land, goods, and animals? Many contemporary social, economic, political, and doctrinal developments might
contribute to an explanation.
For example, social historians of the period suggest that, in early
Tudor times, "new families" who had made their money as merchants
(or lawyers) were moving up into the landowning class in much greater
"
numbers than before.27
' It may be that persons accustomed to dealing
with "property" in the sense of commodities and sums of money carried
over their expectations and their terminology to the landed status they
271.

TAWNEY,

supra note 51, at 186-89, 192-93; R.B.

IN THE ENGLAND OF HENRY
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rapidly acquired.27 Those who viewed their landholdings more as a
source of rental income than as an inherited entitlement to social and
political position would perhaps more readily assimilate land to the
character of goods. As land became more "property-like,' the newly
named "owner" acquired more freedom to alienate, to extract value in
new ways, and to exclude others, while the long-recognized rights of
other persons over the same land were diminished.273
Economic historians have found an active market in land throughout
the entire period of this study, from the twelfth century to the seventeenth.274 The volume of sales and mortgages of land appears to have
picked up greatly in the 1530s, even before Henry VIII began selling
off the enormous landholdings confiscated from the Church.27 At lower
rungs of society, land apparently changed hands at a brisk pace for
centuries. Collective cultivation of manor lands had already begun to
give way to individual holdings.276 New in the sixteenth century was
the "enclosure" of large estates, often to replace customary manorial
tenants with more profitable sheep-raising.277 In the process, tenants
fought to retain their traditional rights of "common," rights to pasture
their own field animals.278 As in the theologians' and philosophers'
creation stories, "property" was replacing "community." New holdings
for English "proprietors" in America called for new formulations of
the origin and justification for property in land, as other European
imperial powers were finding.279
The rapid political changes beginning with the accession of Henry
VII and continuing through the Civil War provide another source of
explanation for this change in legal terminology and conceptions. The
272. Justice Fitzherbert, in a manuscript report of 1527 uncovered by John Baker,
stated: "common law and common reason consider goods, chattels, and money, as
highly as land, for many people who do not have lands have goods and money of as
great value as land." 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 65, at 209. See
SMITH, supra note 270, at 255.
273. See, e.g., 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 65, at 178-80, and
sources cited therein.
274. See DYER, supra note 51, at 51, 110-11; MACFARLANE, supra note 51, at 12430; TAWNEY, supra note 51, at 59-61, 78-80, 90-93.
275. SMITH, supra note 270, at 216, 218-19, 221, 253; Buck, supra note 48, at 210.
276. TAWNEY, supra note 51, at 172, 405.
277. Id. at 180-85, 216-17.
278. Id. at 240-53.

279. WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 6-7, 14-16 (1977);
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 13842, 201-5 (1990).
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king had always been an active litigant in his own courts, and carved
out exceptions to countless common law rules for his special prerogative.
The increased pretensions, intrusions, and revenue needs of the Tudor
kings and queens led, however, to a great deal of new law about king
and subject. From the standpoint of the common law, the social distinctions between persons diminished significantly in this period, while
the gulf between the sovereign and everybody else widened. Despite the
truism that all land was held of the king, many of the references to a
more generalized "property" in land and goods that began to appear
in legal literature after 1485 were in the context of conflicting claims
of king and subject. As such, they tapped the wealth of continental
political thinking, most of it embodied in civilian terminology, about
the right of the "prince" to take property from persons.280
The religious upheavals that England underwent in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries brought theological issues, including the debates
on the nature and origin of property, into parliamentary discourse and
public controversy to a much greater extent than ever before. Property
"in the abstract" for purposes of theological and political debate, grew
to include land as well as goods. The pull away from Rome also brought
the church courts and common law courts closer together, and helped
to "domesticate" and "secularize" the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over
"
transmission of goods at death.28
' The two previously separate categories
of land and chattels were brought closer together in this way as well.
Running in tandem with these changes were "internal" factors that
may have helped pull English common law doctrines on land, goods,
and animals together under an overarching rubric of "property" The
legal treatment of land changed in important ways in the sixteenth
century to resemble more closely the legal treatment of chattels. Recalling that leases of land for terms of years were chattels real within
the scope of "property" in the lawyer's usage, an assimilation may have
come when ejectment, originally a remedy for termors, largely replaced
the older remedies for freeholders.282 In particular, Parliament in 1540
permitted wills of land. Though the "use" forerunner of the trust, had
long permitted testators to make effective disposition of the beneficial
occupation of their land, the common lawyers formally abandoned the
regime of compulsory primogeniture when, under the Statute of Wills,
280. See supra, text accompanying notes 213, 225-26; R. v. Bates, 2 State Trials 183
(1610) (Yelverton); SCHLATTER, supra note 222, at 75-76, 80.
281. HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 188-93.
282. See, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 49, at 144-47 (ejectment); 7 W.S. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458 (1937).
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testators could direct the descent of "right" to their land with the same
freedom that they had always enjoyed to devise the "property" in their
goods. 3'

Lastly, some causation must have run in the opposite direction. Changes
in the way lawyers talked and thought about their clients' relationships
with others and with the material world helped contribute to some or
all these social, economic, political, religious, and doctrinal changes.
Throughout the period under study, one of the principal attributes of
legal thought was its internal compulsion toward increasing simplification and abstraction. When speaking of "property" English common
lawyers pursued this tendency in the direction of increasing convergence
with their continental counterparts and toward increasing use of civilian
and canonist models for both legal terminology and substantive legal
conceptions. In a place or a time in which those aspiring to profound
learning were less enamored of classical and cosmopolitan sources, a
very different law of property might have emerged, or no law of property
at all.
283. Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1 (1540); see Buck, supra note 48, passim, esp.
212-15.

